Military doctrines and democratic transition: a comparative perspective on Indonesia's dual function and Latin American national security doctrines by Honna, Jun
REGIME CHANGE AND REGIME MAINTENANCE 
llN ASIA AND THlB PACXlFIC 
Discussion Paper No. 22 
Military Doctrines and Democratic 
Transition: A Comparative Perspective on 
Indonesia's Dual Function and Latin 
American National Security Doctrines 
JUNHONNA 
Published by 
The Department of Political and Social Change 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 
The Australian National University 
1999 
© Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific 
and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 1999 
Apart from any fair dealings for the purpose of study, criticism or review, as 
permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any 
process without written permission. Enquiries may be made to the publisher. 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication 
Military doctrines and democratic transition : a 
Comparative perspective on Indonesia's dual function 
And Latin American national security doctrines. 
Bibliography 
1. Civil-military relations - Indonesia. 2. Military 
doctrine - Indonesia. 3. National security - Indonesia. 4. 
Politics and government - 1966-. I. Australian National 
University. Dept. of Political and Social Change. II 
Title. (Series: Regime change and regime maintenance in 
Asia and the Pacific. Discussion paper series ; no. 22). 
ISBN 0 7315 2676 7. 
ISSN 1037-1036 
Printed in Canberra by Panther Publishing Press. 
MILITARY DOCTRINES AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON INDONESIA'S DUAL 
FUNCTION AND LATIN AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 
DOCTRINES 
Jun Honna 
This paper attempts to clarify the ideological characteristic of the 
Indonesian military ' s  dual-function doctrine (or dwifungsi) by bringing 
cross-national comparative perspectives into the scope of analysis. In 
scholarship of Indonesian military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia, ABRI), comparative analysis has been conducted to better 
understand the political role of the military. 1 This paper aims to make a 
contribution to such an attempt by examining the ideological basis of 
ABRI' s political involvement compared with other militaries which have 
also played heavy political roles. 
ABRI frequently claims that Indonesian civil-military relations,  
represented in the official doctrine of dwifungsi, are unique, as dwifungsi 
is deeply rooted in the nation's history and culture. Dwifungsi insists that 
ABRI, since the independence war in 1940s, has played a guardian role in 
nation-building, and thus has a right to involve itself in the sociopolitical 
field apart from its defence role. This doctrine was officially adopted 
under General Soeharto's New Order regime which was launched after the 
abortive coup in 1 965 and the subsequent fall of President Sukarno. The 
Soeharto polity was backed by ABRI and the military involvement in 
politics was intensified during the first decade of the new regime. Having 
faced the growing social criticism of dwifungsi and demands for political 
democratization during three decades, ABRI officers have insisted that 
the doctrine is not aimed at militarism but directed to democracy based 
on Indonesia's own cultural and historical values. It is implied that ABRI's 
political engagement should be understood as a commitment to the 
development of Pancasila democracy, and thus cannot be compared with 
1 
the political roles played by military regimes in other developing 
countries. 2 
ABRI's claim may be partly true, but it still invites comparison with 
other Third World militaries which have developed doctrines to justify 
their political intervention, and the way in which these have been eroded 
in the face of democratic pressures.  Although culture and history 
produce particular patterns of civil-military relations in a society, they do 
not eliminate commonalities between nations, due largely to similarities in 
the military's organizational environment and status in the modem 
nation-state. Thus the idea of dwifungsi may be better understood 
through comparing civil-military relations in the process of third-world 
democratization. 
Our target analytical parameter here3 is the military doctrine of 
political activism-how it has been shaped, reproduced, and finally 
revised as the military faces the political demand for democratization. 
From this perspective, we will primarily-but not exclusively-examine 
the cases of Latin America where militaries have developed a political 
doctrine, the so-called the National Security Doctrine (DSN: Doctrina de 
Seguridad Nacional).  In all cases there, the militaries which had once 
governed experienced a retreat from politics with the reinstallation of 
civilian governments .  We ask: in what ways has the DSN played a 
significant role in the processes of military intervention and withdrawal? 
And what are the lessons and implications for the dw if ung s i­
democratization issue? 
In order to answer these questions, the first four sections of this paper 
examine the genesis and application of the DSN. Then, in the following 
three sections, the general dynamics of military disengagement from 
politics and related theoretical problems are discussed. Finally, we will 
come back to the DSN and attempt to clarify some major aspects of 
crafting military doctrines to marginalize military influence and 
consolidate democratic transition. The implications for dwifungsi are 
examined in those contexts. 
2 
The formulation of DSN 
Many students of military regimes in Latin America have noted new 
features of military intervention in the mid 1960s. Especially in Brazil 
( 1964), Peru ( 1 968), Chile ( 1 973) and Argentina ( 1 976), new military 
regimes were established not only to solve problems of short-term 
political instability, but also to achieve far-ranging projects of political, 
economic, social and cultural reform. These coups were no longer revolts 
by lower-ranking commanders but were decisions of military 
headquarters ; they were the product of professional officers who had 
formulated the DSN in higher educational institutions within the military, 
for example at the Superior War College (ESG) in Brazil and the Centre 
for Higher Military Studies (CAEM) in Peru. This doctrine linked 
internal security and economic development as the professional tasks of 
the military. Given the economic stagnation experienced since the 1950s, 
which showed the structural limitations of Latin America's domestic 
markets in making the transition from import-substitution 
industrialization to self-sustained economic growth, these countries faced 
the rise of populist forces and radical politics as the masses were 
mobilized for wider political participation. 4 The DSN was intended to 
counter these challenges and to set internal security as a precondition for 
further economic development, thus providing the necessary rationale for 
the military's political domination. 
The genesis of this doctrine, its inclination to see security and 
development as a coherent whole, and the logic of legitimizing military 
involvement in political life, are quite similar to ABRI's dwifangsi. It was 
the rise of the communist party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and 
Sukarno's radical-populist policies which created political and economic 
concerns among army generals .  The Army Staff and Command College 
(Seskoad),  had conducted studies of economic development, 
collaborating with US-trained economists. In a second army seminar in 
1 966, the army declared its commitment to internal security and 
economic development, and defined itself as the guardian of national 
development and the dynamizer of national life. ABRI's self-perception 
of its role was soon formulated as the doctrine of dwifangsi. 
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Similarity can also be seen in the evolution of the two doctrines. The 
DSN was presented by Latin American military thinkers as a doctrine 
derived from the social sciences, especially from political science and 
geopolitics; this, it was thought, might make it scientific, technical, and 
therefore politically neutral. 5 ABRI officers-especially the young 
generation-rationalized dwifungsi by employing a systems approach 
from political science, with its functionalist description of political order, 
presented, for example, by Huntington and Janowitz. Geopolitics and 
geostrategy were also emphasized in consolidating threat perceptions 
which led to the conclusion that the national environment had forced 
ABRI to accept internal security and economic development as 
inseparable goals, in tum legitimatizing the military's political role in 
society .  6 In both the DSN and dwifungsi , emphasis on objectivity in 
defining threat environments is an important means to internalize 
doctrinal legitimacy in both the military and society. This doctrinal 
arrangement shows a commonality in the ways that the military attempts 
to institutionalize its access to the political arena. 
Pion-Berlin ( 1 988 :396) argues that DSN had three components :  
security/development, geopolitics,  and counterinsurgency (Cl) .  Cl 
developed in the late 1 950s and early 1 960s in France and the US, 
respectively, in response to revolutionary warfare in Algeria and Vietnam. 
The French and American Cl theorists took the writings of Mao Tse 
Tung seriously, believing that revolutionary efforts were successful only 
where they cultivated popular support through a politically informed 
strategy that combined political , military, economic, societal and 
psychological aspects. The DSN's operational design was greatly 
influenced by the French counter-revolutionary doctrine and the US civic 
mission program-practised, for example, in the Philippines-which 
involved psychological operations to 'win the hearts of the people' , 
improve the popular image of the government, and gather information 
about subversive elements from local residents.7 It was in this context that 
internal security missions defined in the DSN encompassed military, 
political, social, economic, cultural and ideological defence as a coherent 
whole, creating the Latin American version of lpoleksosbudmil (the 
acronym used in the Indonesian military in referring to 'ideological­
political-economic-sociocultural-military' areas of national life).8 In its 
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doctrinal formulation, Cl against Maoism was reinforced by Clausewitz's 
dictum that 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' . The 
fusion of Cl and Clausewitz contributed to the blurring of the boundary 
between military and non-military aspects of national life (Pion-Berlin 
1 98 8 : 386-87) .  9 
In this way, the DSN's basic pillars-of convergence of internal 
security and economic development, its geopolitical platform, and 
counterinsurgency-seem to be compatible with dwifungsi's components. 
Another issue is the self-image of Latin American armies before the 
formulation of the DSN. This is significant in assessing the ideological 
incentive to create such an all-encompassing military doctrine. Nunn's 
study ( 1 992: 1 1 3-50) describes their self-images as centred on being 
creators, defenders and integrators of the nations. These are all familiar 
terms for the student of the Indonesian military. The officers in Brazil 
and Chile, however, further attempted to synchronize these self-images 
with constitutional legitimacy, by revising constitutions and legally 
assigning the military to protect the 'constitutional order' and serve as 
the 'guarantor' of the constitution. Thus, the revised constitutions in 
Latin America in the 1 970s and 1 980s generally acknowledged the 
military's legitimate political role and justified military participation at all 
levels of policy making and administration. 10 'Constitutionalization' of 
the military's political mission and self-image was a necessary step to 
secure the implementation of the DSN and to diversify its basis of 
legitimacy. In Indonesia, where the constitution was not revised under the 
New Order, ABRI's self-image as the defender of the constitution (UUD 
45) has not been given such constitutional status, but dwifungsi's political 
mission was formally legalised in 1982, providing legitimation in the eyes 
of ABRI officers. 
ABRI's traditional claim that dwifungsi is uniquely Indonesian seems, 
therefore, to be undermined. ABRI shares significant similarities in 
doctrinal settings and legitimacy-building measures with many of the 
politically active militaries in Latin America. What, then, of the impact of 
doctrine? Doctrine has impact both internally and externally on the 
military. The main focus of discussion in scholarship on the Latin 
American military regarding the internal aspect has been the impact of 
DSN on military professionalism; in regard to the external aspect, the 
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main concern has been the assessment of policy variants under the 
common doctrine. We will examine the two below. 
The DSN and 'new' professionalism 
Alfred Stepan ( 1973) contributed greatly to the study of Latin American 
military politics by providing a controversial argument about the 
changing pattern of military professionalism after the formation of the 
DSN. His argument can be summarized as follows. Samuel Huntington's 
classical conception of military professionalism presumes that the 
military's  primary mission is the conduct of external warfare, thus its 
professionalization inevitably leads to the specialization of military skills 
in a way that is incompatible with any other significant social and 
political roles. Therefore, according to Huntington, professionalization 
depoliticises the military. Stepan accepted this argument in part but 
developed his thesis that, in Latin America, where the primary mission of 
the military is internal warfare, the skill-specialization of military officers 
is not limited to narrow military affairs but expands to the wider social, 
economic, and political spheres .  Thus, when internal security is the 
military's chief concern, professionalization politicizes the military and 
encourages its role expansion . This is what he called 'new 
professionalism' , in contrast to Huntington's 'old professionalism' . In his 
model, Stepan emphasized the role of DSN which requires economic 
development for the maintenance of internal security. He paid particular 
attention to the processes through which the doctrine had been studied 
and socialized in the ESG and CAEM since the 1 950s, and concluded 
that such military schooling changed the professional orientation of the 
Brazilian and Peruvian militaries (ibid.:48-62). By defining this new 
trend as the 'new professionalism of internal security and national 
development' ,  Stepan introduced a landmark concept in the literature on 
modem Latin American civil-military relations. I I 
At this point, our comparative study should pay attention to the 
linkage of five factors: doctrine, internal security, economic development, 
professionalism and political activism. Stepan's assumptions flow as 
follows: a change in threat target (from external to internal) leads to the 
modification of doctrinal content (from conventional warfare to security-
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development fusion) [Step 1]; a change in doctrinal content alters the 
type of professionalism (from 'old' to 'new' )  [Step 2]; and a change in 
professional orientation shifts the military's role in society (from a 
moderator of the political game to the director of the political system) 
[Step 3 ] .  Before examining how this thesis fits ABRI's case, it is worth 
looking at major critiques of Stepan. 
First, the new professionalism thesis has been criticized from a 
historical perspective. McCann ( 1 979:506-7), for example, argues that: 
'if you study the Brazilian military role in politics from the perspective 
of the post- 1 964 political arena, Stepan's  "new professionalism" seems 
reasonable. If you approach it from a historical analysis of the military 
institution, it begins to lose its newness and the situation of the last fifteen 
years appears as the logical outcome of long-range evolution'.  McCann 
insists that since the 1930s the Brazilian army has been committed t� 
internal security to fulfil its historical responsibility as guardian of 
national unity and order (ibid. :5 19-20). His argument supports Nunn's 
extensive historical study, published a year before Stepan's article. 
Stepan's argument posits a historical break of the mid 1960s .  Nunn 
however asserts: 
that the military profession exists in Brazil in a context different from 
that of some other parts of the Western world is no longer in doubt. 
That the profession now exists in Brazil in a different context than in 
that country's past is, however, questionable. The army has changed 
radically since 1870, but within the parameters of change, especially 
since 1920, the professional army has maintained its role as 'defender of 
national honour' (Nunn 1972:54).1
2 
What is unchanged since the early twentieth century, according to 
Nunn ( 1972:47, italics added) is that 'the professional officer has a sense 
of responsibility toward the nation (ethnic aggregation) and the state (the 
political domain) and the society or community. When the state does not 
serve the interests of the national and societal totality, however, it is in 
danger of being opposed by the one who sees himself as truly 
representative. In Brazil it is the professional soldier who sees himself in 
this role' . 
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Secondly, from an institutional perspective, an objection has been 
posed by Markoff and Baretta ( 1 985). Their detailed study suggests that 
Stepan exaggerates the role of the ESG. Long before the ESG was 
established, the army vainly attempted to govern Brazil. Moreover, they 
believe that the ESG had concerns for economic development and 
internal security from early days. They therefore conclude that 'Stepan's 
new professionalism is actually old professionalism in the Brazilian 
context' .13 
For students of comparative civil-military relations, these criticisms, 
based on historical and institutional perspectives, and directed at Step 3 
(see above)-i.e. the impact of professionalism on the military's role in 
society-carry some conviction, as Stepan tends to dismiss the gradual 
historical process in which rival perspectives compete for predominance, 
a process natural in any institutional change.14 However, in terms of 
Stepan' s broader argument including Step 1 and Step 2, the critiques are 
less convincing. Both Nunn and McCann identify concerns within the 
military regarding internal security and economic development from the 
1 930s. They argue that both professionalism and Messianic self-images 
resulted in 'professional militarism' . But these points do not deny 
Stepan's argument that internal security and economic development 
became the military's simultaneous 'professional missions ' after the 
formation of the DSN.15 In other words, internal security and economic 
development were 'concerns' before the 1960s, but not yet defined as 
primary professional missions. As Stepan emphasizes, it was the new 
doctrine in the mid 1 960s which institutionally established and 
legitimized internal security as the primary mission of the already highly 
professionalized Brazilian military, and systematically linked economic 
development as a prerequisite for the attainment of internal security. 
Stepan's argument in Step 1 and Step 2, therefore, survives. It is not 
sufficient for his critics to reject his new professionalism argument by 
simply objecting to the final point, Step 3.16 
Other scholars have applied Stepan's concept to Third-World 
militarism elsewhere, including the Indonesian military. Casper ( 1 99 1  ), 
for example, describes the new professionalism as one of the sources of 
political activism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She 
suggests that: 'the nation-building programs taught at the National 
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Defence College and the Command and General Staff College brought 
institutional change within the AFP and it was clearly an important factor 
in explaining its willingness to intervene to put an end to the Marcos 
regime' . Moreover, ' in both Brazil and the Philippines, the military 
schools introduced or expanded nation-building and administration 
classes. This training led the officers to see themselves as equal to 
bureaucrats and politicians, whereas previously they had been willing to 
defer in non-military areas '  (ibid.: 197, 200, 206).17 In terms of Step 3, 
this argument seems to fit the new professionalism since it shows that 
professional socialization of domestic affairs leads to political activism. 
But it is not clear, first, whether economic development and internal 
security were built into the primary professional mission, or, secondly, 
whether there was a visible 'change' in the schooling program. If the 
political activism merely resulted from the military's anxiety about the 
corrupt dictatorship and the inefficient state administration, and if its goal 
was to overthrow the national leader, and if the 'contextual' change in 
education is not presented, the argument does not accurately fit Stepan's 
thesis .  It is, rather, close to Nunn's argument-that professionalization 
tends to lead to politicization-which supports the classic studies of Finer 
and others.18 
The core argument in Stepan's new professionalism, therefore, is not 
whether a professional military thinks internal security is a part of its task. 
As Stepan's critics have shown, such a concern certainly existed long 
before the mid 1 960s. What makes Stepan's thesis interesting is the 
introduction of a new doctrine encompassing internal security and 
economic development as a coherent whole, with the resulting shift in the 
primary professional mission from a normal defence role-whether 
concerned with external defence or internal security-to that of state 
manager.  19 If the military merely expands its role while receiving 
professional training, without change in professional orientation, the case 
better fits one or other of the professionalization-politicization schemes 
presented by Huntington's critics for the analysis of Third World military 
intervention in politics. 
To emphasize the significance of the role of the doctrine, Stepan 
interestingly mentioned the case of Indonesia, where Seskoad had 
formulated a development and security doctrine in the early 1960s that 
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was later implemented under the New Order government (ibid.:5 1 ,  n.5).  
However, Seskoad's emphasis on economic development and internal 
security were-unlike their Latin American counterparts-not derived 
from professional concerns. There was not even a single sentence in the 
official document of the 1 966 Second Army Seminar at Seskoad about 
the professional mission of ABRI in the coming decades. In the early 
New Order, both stability and economic development were certainly built 
into ABRI's Hankamrata (Total People' s  Defence) doctrine, but their link 
with professionalism was thin. This was understandable given the fact that 
politicization of the officer corps came first and professionalization 
followed, in the history of the Indonesian military. Thus, Step 3 in 
Stepan' s  thesis is not applicable in the case of ABRI. ABRI' s 
professionalization of internal security and national development-which 
proceeded after ABRI had secured its dominant role in politics-only 
reinforced what was already there under the New Order. Professionalism 
is a key concept among the generation of officers who entered the 
military academy after the late 1 950s, in relation to the better 
management of dwifungsi. It is in this context that the concept has been 
reinterpreted to incorporate the sociopolitical mission of dwifungsi. Thus 
it cannot be said that the change in professional orientation politicized 
ABRI-the thesis argued by Stepan; rather, an already-politicized 
military promoted the idea of new professionalism in adaptive ways. 20 
Finally, in contrast to the Latin American military, which identifies 
itself in the first place as a professional institution and secondly as a 
political actor, ABRI-as expressed in the dwifungsi declaration-defines 
itself first as a freedom-fighter who has a right to participate in politics, 
and secondly as a professional soldier. This difference again 
demonstrates that ABRI's political commitment is not primarily derived 
from professional concern. 
We have seen that ABRI and Latin American political militaries share 
many characteristics,  such as components in their doctrines and 
professional education which focuses heavily on the value of political 
stability; nevertheless, what Stepan sees as the 'new' dynamics, i .e.  the 
way in which the change in professionalism politicizes the military, does 
not fit ABRI's experience. What, then, of the interpretation of the 
doctrine, and what does the comparison imply? 
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Variants of DSN interpretation 
Scholarship on DSN acknowledges the variety of doctrinal interpretations 
among military regimes. First, in terms of the influence of geopolitics in 
doctrinal assessment, the case of Peru is often distinguished from Brazil, 
Argentina and Chile. Pion-Berlin ( 1989a:42 1 -25) points out that, relative 
to these three countries, the Peruvian military regime between 1 968 and 
1975 gave less weight to geopolitical theories in its rationale for the 
authoritarian national security state. Rather, DSN was modified by 
military thinkers associated with the reformist military regime to pay 
more attention to national development. Although the weighting is a 
matter of degree, the Peruvian style is often described as 'soft-line' in 
contrast to the geopolitical emphasis of the 'hard-line' approach seen in 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile. 21 
In the hard-line school, DSN advocates associated emerging 
'subversive' activities (mainly but not exclusively communist) in the 
domestic arena with the geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers. 
They asserted that the repression of progressive social and political 
change was imperative to maintain national security. Within this broad 
paradigm, the geopolitical thinking said little about how the national 
security threat would take root domestically, or who would be its 
principal sponsors. A space for arbitrary interpretation existed here, and 
the ambiguity was manipulated by an aggressive military that felt free to 
choose its own enemies . As Pion-Berlin ( 1988 :390) suggests , this 
obscurity provided a licence for unbridled state power and militarization 
of society. 'Ideological subversion' then became the invented subject of 
military operations.  22 
ABRI's threat perception and dwifungsi legitimation have shared a 
similar logic. Wawasan Nusantara, which is defined as an unalterable 
'national' geopolitical doctrine, sees subversion as the main threat to 
security, which may be enlarged through foreign ideological penetration. 
The subversion takes the form of anti-Pancasila and anti-UUD 45 
ideology, according to the Indonesian geopolitical theory. In defining 
subversive actors, ideologies and activities,  this doctrinal vagueness has 
provided ABRI with interpretative power to label certain groups as 
subversive agents. As democratic pressure grew under the late New Order, 
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this frequently became ABRI's dominant approach. Military concepts of 
KGB (new-style communism), OTB ( [communist] organization without 
organization), GPK (security-disturbance movements), and 'Western' 
liberalism, for example, allowed ABRI to paint government critics as 
subversives. By doing so, ABRI created a 'buffer zone' between the 
government and legitimate social demands ,  absorbing 'excessive' 
demands and transferring them to the area of non-politics, that is, military 
operations. The 'flexible' geopolitical doctrine also produced a rationale 
for the military to conduct Ipoleksosbudmil missions to safeguard 
national sovereignty. Dwifungsi was built into this formula as an 
embodiment of ABRI's commitment to national security and 
development. 
Apart from geopolitics ,  the DSN's economic-development aspect 
should be noted. The hard-line approach interpreted the link between 
security and development in terms of orthodox strategies of 
modernization and the need to remove the political obstacles for 
economic growth. Typically, officers favoured closing channels to mass 
mobilization that encouraged populist politics and 'unreasonable' labour 
demands (Fitch 1993 :23). However, in Peru reformist and radical officers 
developed an alternative ' soft-line' interpretation which stressed 
economic dependency, socio-economic inequality, and elite-dominated 
political systems as the principal causes of domestic insurgency. They 
also advocated socialist reform. The Peruvian experience made scholars 
aware of the breadth of possible interpretation of DSN. There, a 
professionalized and politically active military in the 1 960s found that 
the principal threat to national security and development lay in 
exploitation by the oligarchy and its foreign accomplices, leading to the 
emergence of a radical reformist military regime. 23 
Peru's left-wing variety of DSN not only illustrated the indigenization 
of a common doctrine but also indicated that commitment to particular 
policies was extremely weak. Dwifungsi is the same. Since the beginning 
of New Order, ABRI has faced the growing intra-military criticism of 
dwifungsi's 'policy implementation' ,  although there seems to have been 
an agreement on its 'principle' .  In the case of the DSN, Fitch ( 1 986 :29) 
argues that the general acceptance of the DSN did not prevent serious 
internal splits over specific policies in Brazil. Also, Stepan, who in 1 973 
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emphasized the significant role played by Peru's CAEM in socializing the 
new professional doctrine, later revised his assessment, insisting that 
CAEM circles were actually not the core ruling group which 
implemented the radical reform project. 24 It can be concluded that both 
dwifungsi and the DSN provide a coherent ideological lens through 
which military officers can look at the state of the nation, their expected 
missions, and how economic development is imperative for internal 
security, but it does not necessarily help unify the officer corps or 
cultivate consensus on policy implementation. 
The DSN and antipolitics 
Despite variations in interpretation and policy implementation, the 
military regimes under DSN influence shared a common structure of 
political control. A major attempt to generalize this commonality can be 
found in the work of Loveman and Davies ( 1989), who insist that the 
basic paradigm of these regimes-'military antipolitics'-applies to both 
leftist and rightist variants .  For them, the left-right gap was bridged by a 
common perception among professional officers who rejected the 
political process, seeing it as the source of underdevelopment, corruption 
and evil. 
It [antipolitics] is antiliberal and anti-Marxist. It assumes repression of 
opposition, silencing or censoring of the media, and subordinating the 
labor movement to the objectives of the regime .... It does not willingly 
tolerate strikes by workers.... It places high priority on economic 
growth and is usually little concerned with income distribution except 
insofar as worker or white-collar discontent leads to protest and 
disorder .... It can use elections, pseudopolitical parties, and plebiscites in 
order to give a veneer of "democratic" legitimacy to authoritarian 
direction of the state and society (ibid. : 12-13). 
The Peruvian revolutionary project ( 1968-75) adopted mobilizational 
inclusionary strategies of economic modernization but the left-wing 
military antipoliticians did not see themselves as being dedicated to class 
interests. Contaminated by DSN, officers found the principal enemies in 
the Peruvian landed oligarchy and allied US capitalists, but this was a 
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reflection of their nationalism, not Marxism. In this context, the radical 
revolution took the form of authoritarian statism to command the 
direction of social empowerment. Here, antipolitics was adopted to 
maintain the supremacy of the state over society, as seen in right-wing 
regimes inspired by the DSN. 
Antipolitical techniques also provided similarities .  In Brazil, the 
military's political project involved the development of the industry of 
torture, aiming to eliminate 'subversives '-often by summary murder of 
suspects-in order to 'atomize' Brazilian society . Rabid anti-Marxism 
was also a feature of the military regimes of Chile and Uruguay, where 
terror became an official instrument to accomplish the 'public ' policy of 
social cleansing. The DSN-inspired Proceso government in Argentina 
( 1976-83) also launched a notorious campaign of state terror against its 
internal threats-politicians and subversives . This 'dirty-war' left 
thousands dead as well as disappearances of ' subversives' in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (Zirker 1 988 :592; Epstein 1 984: 39).25 
Importantly, once DSN emerged as the dominant belief, military 
rulers in these countries concluded that security and development could 
only be achieved by a long-term military regime, thus relieving them 
from insisting-in the traditional way-that intervention in politics was 
temporary or undesirable in principle. Under these circumstances,  
whatever their differences over economic management, the construction 
of an antipolitical environment was soon recognized as imperative to 
achieving security and development. As if to reflect their role perception 
as the national guardian, ambitious and aggressive military programs of 
political control were generally justified as 'defensive' missions to rescue 
their nations from the threat of subversion and chaos (Loveman and 
Davies 1989:307). 
These characteristics of the 'new professionalism of military 
antipolitics '  (Loveman and Davies 1989), commonly seen in the Latin 
American professional militarism, are nothing new for students of ABRI. 
ABRI's antipolitical officers are anti-liberal and anti-Marxist. They have 
supported measures to censor the media. Intervention in labour affairs 
has been a part of the mission of Kopkamtib/Bakorstanas.26 They have 
relied primarily on the 'trickle-down' growth strategy, while concerns 
about the widening socio-economic gap in society are assessed in security 
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terms. Pseudo-democratic institutions-such as elections,  party-politics, 
parliaments and constitutionalism-are supported to give a 'democratic 
face' and legitimacy to the regime, but 'political society' has been 
subjected to intervention, quite frequently by using both formal and 
informal channels and direct and indirect measures .  Extra-judicial 
killings of citizens,  systematic torturing of suspected ' subversives' ,  and 
abduction of political activists-including teenager students-have been 
conducted in highly professional ways, often by ABRI's best-trained 
special force, Kopassus. 27 
However, for our comparative study, it is not enough merely to 
recognize these similarities in the external outcomes of military 
antipolitics. It is also necessary to see the pattern of perceptional 
development before and after the introduction of the DSN. Military 
intervention in politics surely existed in pre-DSN Latin America, but the 
engagement was essentially ad hoc.28 The military at that time often 
targeted internal threats in its combat operations,  while concerns about 
economic underdevelopment also existed. If these two factors-internal 
security and economic development-were present both before and after 
the introduction of the DSN, why did the military seek its enduring 
involvement in politics only in the latter period? One answer lies in the 
nature of the DSN. 
There was little fundamental change in the military's 'ways'  of 
attacking internal subversive elements,  namely, by mobilizing 
intelligence, paramilitary units and special anti-terrorist troops. What 
changed, however, after the DSN phenomenon was the military' s  
'definition ' of  these elements. The doctrine had systematically 
incorporated modernization economics into the professional internal­
security mindset. The military's old 'concerns' about underdevelopment 
were now elaborated with the inclusion of the concepts of the open world 
economy and latecomer modernization. Having packed these economic 
theories into its arsenal, the military reached two conclusions. First, 
successful implementation of development projects could not be achieved 
through traditional short-term access to the government. Secondly, 
'catch-up' economic modernization-which required low wages and 
disciplined labour to attract foreign investments (or to facilitate capital 
accumulation in the case of left-wing regimes )-needed strong state 
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control over society. It was against this background that repressive 
antipolitics became the logical outcome of the military' s commitment to 
these two ends. To maintain political stability, regime critics had to be 
eliminated. To control society, 'politics'-which is uncertain and disturbs 
social harmony-had to be buried and replaced by 'administration ' with 
a high discipline. Definitional expansion of 'subversion' (or more 
broadly deviance from state projects) had its roots here, aiming to justify 
the military's elimination and surveillance activities.29 
Therefore, in answering the question above, it can be argued that, in 
terms of internal military dynamics, the prime mover in the transition 
between 'traditional' and 'new' militaries was not the aspect of internal 
security but that of economic development. If the DSN had only carried 
concerns about internal security, neither permanent takeover of the 
government nor establishment of an antipolitical environment was crucial 
or justifiable. Many developing countries assign their soldiers to 
counterinsurgency missions without leading to military takeover of the 
government. It was the spread of economic development thought (or 
ideology) to the professional doctrinal arena that gave birth to a military 
which sought perpetual involvement in politics and the adoption of 
antipolitics. 30 
These reflections on the doctrinal origin of antipolitics provide some 
hypotheses for our study of the Indonesian military. It seems obvious 
that the New Order ABRI desired to permanently involve itself in politics. 
It has been said that there is no 'back-to-the-barracks ' in ABRI's 
dictionary . Since the New Order was not a military regime in a strict 
sense, a simple comparison with hard-core militarism in Latin America 
should be avoided. However, it can be argued that ABRI's claim for 
permanent involvement in politics-and its antipolitical attitudes-are 
similarly derived from its built-in economic development ideology. When 
the retired revolutionary generation officers say that ABRI should retreat 
from everyday intervention, their motive is not only to earn popularity in 
society but, to some extent, reflects their belief in the traditional role 
perception of ABRI. As in Latin America before DSN, the Indonesian 
military's core role perception was that of guardian, believing intervention 
was the result of civilian failure to protect national interests .  Importantly, 
as was obvious in the Latin American case, this traditional perception 
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itself did not necessarily oblige the military to permanently intervene in 
politics. It would at most lead the military to having a permanent veto 
power. As if showing their preoccupation with such traditionalism, 
Indonesia's retired generals have often claimed that if Gen Sudirman (the 
charismatic first commander of the Indonesian army during the 
revolutionary period) were still alive, he might oppose the current 
implementation of dwifungsi.31 
On the other hand, the post-revolutionary generation' s  self-image 
was cultivated through education. In this process, traditional perceptions 
were surely inherited, but officers were also indoctrinated in the 
economic modernization ideology. From our comparative perspective, 
this suggests the hypothesis that the socialization of the New Order 
military has had a major impact on the officers' perceptions of the 
desirable level of military commitment in everyday political life. This 
level-we assume-is much higher than that of the traditional role­
perception, because the development mission provides far more areas of 
military concern related to stability maintenance. 32 Of course, not a small 
number of current officers may think that economics is too complex to 
be handled by soldiers. However, in assessing ABRI as an institution, this 
indoctrination process has no doubt encouraged the officer corps to 
regard everyday and permanent engagement in the non-military sector as 
legitimate. 
In this regard, we may conclude that, although there is a generally 
accepted view that the introduction of professionalism has distinguished 
younger generation officers from the revolutionary generation, it is more 
precisely their professional commitment to modernization ideology that 
has marked these academically trained officers. If we accept a claim by 
many officers that dwifungsi has existed since the early days of the 
Republic, we can also argue that this 'old' dwifungsi was already replaced 
by 'new' dwifungsi. The new version under the New Order has favoured 
everyday involvement in all levels of politics to constantly provide the 
professional 'service' of stability maintenance for the realization of long­
term economic development-a 'national interest. ' Some self-images 
derived from the old version, such as 'self-sacrifice' for the nation, and 
ABRI' s role as 'defender' and 'integrator' of the nation, have backed up 
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both internal legitimation of the new dwifungsi and external support of 
antipolitical projects. 
Our comparative doctrinal analysis implies that many of the 
dwifungsi-related phenomena are not unique to Indonesia. If so, what of 
the process and dynamics of doctrinal erosion in the face of the growth 
of democratic pressure? In many Latin American military regimes 
inspired by the DSN, political change in the 1 980s led to military 
disengagement from politics and the resurgence of civilian government. 
Civilians have endeavoured to trim aggressive military doctrines in order 
to secure military subordination to democracy.  Their aim has been to 
dismantle officers' implications of modernization ideology from their 
professional military concerns while not threatening the traditional 
military loyalty to the nation. What is the problem of crafting military 
doctrine in this new way? What implications are there for Indonesia? In 
order to examine these questions, we need first to look at the general 
dynamics of the military extrication process and scholarly attempts to 
conceptualize civil-military relations in democratic transition. We will 
examine these issues of extrication in the next three sections-discussing 
approaches,  analytical deficiencies ,  and political dilemmas-before 
returning to the questions raised above. 
Extrication problem I: approaches 
Beginning in 1979, South American military governments gradually 
relinquished power to civilians, for example in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and 
Brazil.  Economic crisis had undermined the position of the ruling 
military, encouraging divisions within the military institution-always a 
key factor in motivating a military seizure of power-and provoking the 
overthrow of military government. Needler's timely study found common 
attitudes among the officer corps in some of these countries .  Military 
presidents, who had come to power as institutional representatives of the 
military, were seen as using the armed forces to build a personal power 
base independent of the military institution and for self-interested 
purposes that the institution itself did not share (Needler 1 980:622).33 
The increasing gap between the ideal of being the guardian of national 
interests and the reality of being a tool of a self-interested and unpopular 
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president made it possible for military officers to perceive the transfer to 
civilian government as an acceptable choice. This perception was 
encouraged by the deepening economic crisis which showed day after 
day the government's inability to defend the 'national interest' . Similar 
attitudes can be found among Indonesian officers during the late New 
Order period. A growing number of active-duty officers perceived 
Soeharto's apparent tendency to protect his personal political interests at 
the expense of ABRI's institutional interests since the early 1990s. 
Apart from the collapse of the president-military relationship, many 
studies of regime change also recognize internal military conflicts in the 
process of polity transition. Fitch's comparative study in 1 986 
emphasized that, for a decade prior to military extrication, a visible 
common feature among military regimes in Latin America had been the 
conflict between the faction in power and those who performed· normal 
military functions (Fitch 1986:34). This assessment was reflected in 
O'Donnell and Schmitter's influential theoretical work, published in the 
same year. They argued that: 
[A] factor encouraging a withdrawal from government concerns the 
agencies of repression. Whenever this 'instrument' is used protractedly 
and indiscriminately, and whatever the initial formal engagement of the 
military, the units specially responsible tend to develop an increasing 
autonomy and capacity to command resources. This exacerbates old 
rivalries between service branches and leads to skirmishes over 
jurisdictions and methods.... [F]aced with the growth of security 
agencies, professionally minded officers may become willing to support 
a civilianization of authority which can deal effectively with such 
excesses (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:35). 
Emphasizing the role of intra-military conflict-namely between the 
security unit's hardliners and moderate professionals-O'Donnell and 
Schmitter concluded that: 'there is no transition whose beginning is not 
the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime 
itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and 
soft-liners' (ibid.: 1 9).  
This assessment sees the primary cause of democratic transition as a 
'contingent' result of a game among authoritarian agents. Transition, 
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therefore, is random, uncertain, unplanned, unpredictable and shaped by 
their strategic choices. This view challenges structural explanations which 
have tried to find causes in the socio-economic and political structure­
i.e. the lack of regime adaptability to the growing political, economic and 
international pressures on the authoritarian regime. 34 The new emphasis 
was on the action aspect rather than structure. Reflecting this tendency, 
current theories of military disengagement from politics involve a set of 
different approaches between action and structure. It seems reasonable to 
assert that the structural approach may not explain the direct trigger of 
military extrication, because it only describes the environment in which 
decision-makers operate. However, this does not undermine the 
significance of structural analysis, especially when we look at the entire 
process of withdrawal as a 'set'. 
By 'process' , we mean a set of three steps: the pressure for change, 
the decision to withdraw, and the institutionalization of the new civil­
military relationship. In explaining the decision, the action focus is 
useful, but to explain the pressure for, and the subsequent 
institutionalization of, withdrawal, there is no doubt that the structural 
focus is indispensable. For example, attention has to be paid to political 
structure which determines the availability of civilian leaders to whom the 
military may hand over government responsibility (or make partners in a 
new coalition). The economic aspect is also significant: the process by 
which economic crisis delegitimizes the military' s  claim for better 
economic management under authoritarianism, and the way in which 
social mobilization and the rise of a middle-class-as the result of 
economic growth-increase the demand for demilitarizing the political 
s y stem. 35 Even the aspect most unlikely to be the direct trigger to 
withdraw-the international system-is important in assessing the way in 
which the influx of international values, such as human rights and 
democracy, undermines the legitimacy of military rule. 36 The action 
approach, on the other hand, explains things not covered by structural 
approaches, such as the military's motivation and rationale to disengage 
and its optimal timing. Thus, in understanding the entire process of 
military disengagement, both structure and action are indispensable and 
mutually supporting rather than conflicting. This assessment resonates 
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with general scholarly efforts to conceptualize how the structure regulates 
the action and how the action reproduces the structural environment. 37 
This general interest among social scientists in the structure-action 
interaction has inevitably influenced the study of democratization and 
military disengagement from politics. One recent approach has been to 
place an analytical unit between action and structure, namely institution. 
This approach, generally referred to as the 'new institutionalism' , tries to 
bridge actions and structure by analyzing the mediating role of 
institutions both in regulating action patterns and in producing policies 
that affect the structural pattern. 38 Although this has not yet become the 
mainstream approach in scholarship on democratization, there now seems 
to be a consensus about the need for a balance between structural and 
action explanations. 
It is in this theoretical context that our doctrinal focus on the analysis 
of the military extrication process should be . located. One characteristic 
of doctrinal study is that it can potentially bridge different analytical 
levels. For example, it can cover state-military relations and the individual 
officer's political perception. It can also bridge the gap between the 
military's corporate identity and internal cleavage within the officer 
corps. Moreover, our focus mediates the analyses of 'universal' military 
values-such as professionalism-and their ' indigenous' applications. 
The doctrinal study encompasses two processes of military extrication 
from politics : the process in which democratic demand (i.e. structural 
pressure) is perceived by individual officers and reflected in the 
doctrine's interpretative change; and the process in which military officers 
conduct policies (i.e. actions) based on their doctrinal re-interpretations 
which encourage democratic space in the political structure. In other 
words, the doctrinal focus is helpful to mediate the S-A analysis, while at 
the same time it relieves us from borrowing a psychological approach to 
assess officers' political perceptions. As seen in the previous sections, our 
study of the DSN bridges the analysis of the individual officer's belief­
system and the construction of military regimes in Latin America. The 
process of regime demilitarization should be examined in the same 
framework. 
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Extrication problem II: analytical questions 
We have argued that the process-centred view of military extrication treats 
different approaches as mutually supportive. However, in the scholarly 
attempt to understand the changing patterns of civil-military relations, 
there are some analytical problems which are still unsolved. In this 
section, we examine three of them-namely, intervention level, culture, 
and the role of professionalism. 
Danopoulos ( 1 988 :7- 1 3)  suggests that there are four factors 
determining military withdrawal: the nature of intervention-whether the 
military functions as a praetorian moderator, a guardian, or a ruler; the 
performance of soldiers as political governors-the degree and pace of 
legitimacy deflation; professional military concerns-institutional 
incentives to go back to the normal military function; and the availability 
of acceptable alternatives-whether the military can find reliable civilians 
or not. Legitimacy deflation is a significant indicator, but there are many 
cases in which the military dominates politics without public legitimacy, 
and it implies 'loss of legitimacy ' is too vague to be regarded as a 
determinant of military extrication.39 Moreover, presence or absence of 
the civilian alternative largely depends on the military's preference, thus it 
is hard to reduce it to the level of comparative generalization. Factors one 
and three have been subject to more extensive debate. 
Levels of intervention 
Any attempt, like that of Danopoulos, to conceptualize the nature of 
military involvement tends to be categorical or typological. Welch, for 
instance, argues that military involvement should be assessed along a 
spectrum, marked at one pole by unquestioned dominance of military 
officers over all political decisions and at the other pole by untrammelled 
control by governmental officials .  He then distinguishes three 'levels of 
intervention' , namely military influence in politics, military participation 
in politics ,  and military control of government (Welch 1 993 :74-
75; 1 987: 1 3).  The aim of identifying these levels is to characterize the 
changing position of the military in politics .  This kind of approach 
follows Finer's ( 1 962: 86-90) classic description of four levels of 
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intervention-influence, blackmail, displacement of the civilian cabinet, 
and supplantment of the civilian regime. 
Criticism may be derived from at least three perspectives. First, as 
Luckham (197 1 : 2) has asserted, Finer's typology would make it difficult 
to account for the structural and behavioural similarities of the military in 
countries where military intervention has been pushed to different levels, 
such as Haiti, Batista's Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, but 
where the military role in society and politics is very similar. In other 
words, the typological approaches adopted by Finer, Danopoulos and 
Welch look only at the different political status of the military at a given 
time, and make it more difficult to perceive the similarities or 'likeness' 
which undoubtedly exist between certain levels of military intervention. 
As we will see later, this question of likeness becomes a central issue in 
understanding the problem of incomplete extrication, which cannot be 
covered adequately by the 'level' analysis. 
Secondly, from a political process perspective, Lovell and Albright 
( 1997:7) have recently argued that the notion of the civil-military 
distinction failed to take account of the behaviour of the military as an 
interest group. The typological view of the level of military intervention 
makes it difficult to deal with the dynamics of change-for example, 
movement from 'participation ' to 'influence'-which can activate 
lobbying (overt or covert) or political assertiveness on the part of the 
military. Since intervention analysis treats the position (or status) of the 
military in politics as the dependent variable, military politics resulting 
from a shift in the level cannot be covered within this framework. Thus, 
in facing the problem of military re-intervention in politics, level analysis 
can say little about its dynamics. 
Thirdly, typologies of intervention level become useful cross-national 
indicators only in comparing militaries where boundaries between 
military and political roles are sufficiently clear. If the boundary is 
blurred, distinctions between the 'ruler' and the 'moderator' or between 
'participation' and 'influence'-that try to identify the military function 
in the government-are insufficient for grasping the potential power of 
the military which still engages in far-ranging political activities. 40 
Analysis of this sort can unintentionally mix two types of militaries 
(boundary-clear and boundary-blurred) and place potentially different 
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militaries at the same intervention level. From this perspective, it should 
be noted that LIPI's dwifungsi study in 1 996-7, which provided the first 
systematic and comprehensive criticism of dwifungsi by civilians,  
employed the framework by arguing that ABRI should reduce its 
political role to the level of 'participation ' from the current level of 
'dominance' , and should gradually decrease it to 'influence' (Samego et 
al . 1 997:23 1 ). As a political platform, this study showed a collective 
demand for demilitarizing the Indonesian polity. However, viewed from 
the standpoint of extrication theory, the typology does not seem to be 
appropriate to the case of ABRI, which has traditionally rejected the 
boundary in accordance with its dwifungsi doctrine. ABRI may interpret 
'influence'  as synonymous with tut wuri handayani, which-according 
to official interpretation-has already been manifest and implemented 
since the early 1 990s.41 The intervention level analysis, therefore, may 
employ a framework unsuitable for the military, which sees no clear 
boundary between military and political roles. 
Above all, the approach which sees the extrication phenomenon as 
movement along a continuum of civilian and military influence cannot 
deal with the problem of blurred political-military boundaries shaped by 
a country's experience. 42 Because of this limitation, some scholars 
employ cultural approaches in the study of military extrication. 
Culture 
Rebecca Schiffs theory of cultural concordance rejects the current 
tendency of emphasizing the separation of civil and military institutions 
and the authority of the civilian sphere over the military to prevent 
domestic military intervention and secure military withdrawal . By 
contrast, the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, 
and shared values or objectives among the military, political elites and 
society, in order to prevent domestic military (re )intervention. Schiff 
identifies longstanding cultural values as the prime source of determining 
the type of mutual accommodation (Schiff 1 995:7-9, 12; 1 997: 1 20-23) .  
This approach is  insightful in the sense that-unlike the intervention­
level analysis-it does not presuppose a clear boundary between political 
and military affairs and it recognizes military decisions as the product of 
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political c on sensus .  However, the cultural approach invites 
methodological questions.  Once we see culture as the determinant of the 
concordance style, we are turned away from the perspective of power. In 
other words, concordance, or a political pact, often reflects a state of 
uneven equilibrium enforced by the powerful military . Civilian 
acceptance of this equilibrium is not always driven by 'cultural values' 
but often by a fear of coercion or, at best, a pragmatic calculation of 
political strength. There is no doubt that a country's  civil-military 
interaction is influenced by cultural factors, but if we make culture the 
independent variable in the explanation of military (dis)engagement, 
rational-choice aspects of political decision making tend to be left aside, 
and this is not consistent with dominant paradigms in contemporary 
social science. 43 
Apart from the methodological problem, our doctrinal study of 
dwifungsi-and, to a lesser extent, the DSN-leads us to see culture as a 
political tool of domination rather than as a mediator, or a 'shared value' ,  
for the making of elite agreement. Manipulating culture and tradition is 
one mode of military legitimation of its political involvement in 
Indonesia. Both concordance theory and our doctrinal study respect the 
important role played by culture in determining the pattern of civil­
military relations.  However, the former emphasizes its role in formulating 
collective consensus among elites, whereas the latter refers to the 
military's tactical interpretation of indigenous culture to control political 
discourse in favour of military engagement in non-military affairs.  
Perhaps both aspects can be seen in a single military regime, such that the 
difference is not a matter of significance. However, as a comparative 
analytical tool, our approach to culture seems to be less abstract and more 
user-friendly, since it enables researchers to adopt the 'official' 
description of culture to analyze how it is used to justify military 
intervention. 
Professionalism 
Returning to Danopoulos's four factors motivating the military to 
disengage, let us now focus on the third factor-professionalism. 
Danopoulos ( 1 988 :7) argues that 'the disposition or motivation to 
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disengage refers to a situation in which the military becomes convinced 
that the time has come to return to its prescribed professional mission' .44 
This view provides a significant theme in the scholarly analysis of how 
domestically-involved militaries are transformed into externally-oriented 
ones-or, borrowing Stepan's terms, shift from 'new ' to 'old ' 
professionalism. However, at a different level of discussion, of relevance 
to ABRI, it remains a question whether or not it is relevant to link 
professionalism with the military's 'motivation' to withdraw. It should be 
noted at the outset that neither non-professionalism (i.e. lack of corporate 
loyalty to the nation) nor hyper-professionalism (i.e. overloyalty to the 
nation and overconfidence in its managerial ability) motivates extrication, 
since the former may undermine the top leadership's deci sion to 
disengage for the sake of the nation, while the latter urges the officer 
corps' distrust of civilians.45 Although we may exclude these extreme 
cases, we still have to accept-in order to see professionalism as a 
motivation to disengage-an argument that the military decides to 
withdraw because it wants to be a professional military. Needless to say, 
this is a weak thesis because the term 'professionalism' here already 
contains apolitical connotations. The argument defining professionalism 
as the 'disposition' to extricate, therefore, tends to be tautological. 46 If 
the motivation has to be found, it is usually the desire of the military to 
improve its public image, or to end internal military splits. 
This assessment is, of course, not to dismiss the link between 
profess ionalism and extrication.  Characteristic s attached to 
professionalism-such as autonomy, cohesion, corporate interests, and 
loyalty to the nation-may influence the 'pattern' of withdrawal. For 
example, a degree of institutional cohesion helps explain the difference 
between chaotic and organized withdrawal. Maniruzzaman's data-rich 
study suggests that abrupt military withdrawal from politics is common in 
the case of non-professional militaries,  whereas professional militaries 
maintain an effective chain of command and tend to plan their 
withdrawal (Maniruzzaman 1987:chapters 3, 4). 
Institutional autonomy is also a significant factor influencing 
disengagement patterns. Bratton and van de Walle ( 1 97 1 :  17 1 )  found that 
African soldiers-relative to Latin American-were reticent about 
handing power back to civilians and initiating managed transitions.  The 
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reason for this was the weak autonomy of the military vis-a-vis social 
structure. They argue that, instead of professional training, nationalistic 
sentiments, and shared esprit de corps, African militaries in general are 
riven by political factionalism and patronage systems based on ethnic 
solidarities in the ranks. Thus military reinterventions are usually driven 
by a defence of patrimonial material privilege (ibid . : 2 15 - 16). In this 
sense, the lack of institutional autonomy-or high social permeability­
of African armies makes it difficult for them, compared with Latin 
American counterparts, to adopt stable disengagement plans through the 
command structure. 
In sum, professionalism is a significant focus not because it explains 
the motivation to disengage, but because it illustrates the (in)ability of the 
military to arrange the transformation of its 'institutional' orientation in 
an organized way. Without this ability, any withdrawal attempt may face 
disruption. Viewed from this standpoint, ABRI's relative position can be 
found somewhere between less-professional African and historically­
professional Latin American cases . Although ABRI's professional 
standards have been undermined by Soeharto's  (and Sukarno's) 
neopatrimonial manoeuvring, this has not penetrated as deeply as it has in 
African armies. ABRI's professional identity is strong and its sense of 
'national interest' is entrenched. Its command structure is well 
established, and, in comparison with African cases, its ethnically diverse 
officer corps largely shares the profession's corporate values. ABRI 
officers themselves have insisted on these aspects. Thus ABRI would seem 
to possess sufficient professional capacity to transform its institutional 
role orientation via the decision of the top leadership, if it so decides; 
unlike African cases, ABRI's accommodation to managed withdrawal is 
therefore not unlikely if there is a will on the part of the current ABRI 
leadership. This assessment undermines one primitive justification of 
dwifu.ngsi: that ABRI may use guns if it is segregated from politics.47 
Extrication problem Ill: dilemmas of incomplete transition 
In the previous two sections, we have discussed the general dynamics of 
the extrication process and some problems in its theoretical terrain. Our 
final focus is on the question of incomplete withdrawal, which reveals 
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some common dilemmas in the process of democratic trans1t10n and 
implies the importance of revising military doctrines in order to prevent 
military reintervention. Our attempt at employing the lesson of the DSN 
for the better assessment of the prospects for dwifungsi needs to clarify 
these 'dile�as' .  
The term 'withdrawal' is used to explain a 'characteristic' of military 
behaviour, but it cannot encompass the 'degree' of that behaviour 
because of its relativist nature. Viewed from the military, its abandoning 
of direct government 'responsibility ' is obviously a withdrawal 
phenomenon, but in the eyes of civilian democratizers such a step may be 
perceived merely as alleviation of political control without disturbing 
military ascendancy.  48 The difference in standpoint leads to different 
assessments of the same event. Thus, it should first be noted that when we 
discuss the issue of incomplete extrication we deal primarily with the 
perspective of those who want to civilianize the polity and establish a 
strong civilian control mechanism. 
Incomplete extrication typically may be found in the struggle over 
two issues: first, the handling of past human-rights abuses by the military, 
and, secondly, the revision of professional military missions. When the 
military abandons government responsibility, civilian successors are 
almost doomed to face the popular demand for prosecuting the military 
that has committed human rights violations during its rule. Absorbing the 
demand is decisively important in consolidating the political legitimacy 
of the new civilian government.49 The dilemma, however, is that the 
military' s  instincts of self-preservation may provide a motive for 
reintervention when it finally understands the government's inability to let 
the 'patriot' military withdraw with 'honour' . A common feature in 
Latin America, Fitch suggests, is that total withdrawal is unlikely without 
guarantees that human rights abuses and other crimes committed during 
the previous government will not be prosecuted (Fitch 1986:35).50 
The other dilemma is in choosing between the need to revise the 
military's professional mission, and the need to avoid threatening its 
institutional autonomy (and the possible backlash from doing so). 
However, the new government needs to ensure that the military's  
autonomy is not too great, as this may allow some civilians, who are 
unsatisfied with the new government leaders and seek to advance 
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themselves in the 'democratic ' competition, to 'knock on the door of the 
barracks '.  Moreover, it is argued that a 'moral ' institutional status and a 
creditable/honourable role in accomplishing (but not setting) national 
goals must be provided for the military, within a functioning political 
democracy, while at the same time modifying its messianic self-image.51 
Such balancing of policies is not easy. But the goals are very clear: to 
segregate the military from the political arena and to depoliticize the 
military institution. Scholars have argued that these can be achieved by 
infusing, or restoring, apolitical professional missions. In other words, as 
Huntington ( 1996:6) puts it, the emphasis is on rewriting doctrines and 
revising curricula in service academies (as discussed in the next section). 
To use a familiar concept, military doctrines have to be reshaped to 
define the clear boundary between military and political affairs and 
exclude the latter from the professional mission of the military. It is in 
this process of restructuring missions and establishing strong control 
mechanisms that conflict may intensify between the new civilian 
government and the military, as the latter sees such policy initiatives as 
threatening. 52 After all, the legacy of human-rights violations and the 
revision of military missions are the two issue-areas of greatest potential 
conflict between the new civilian government and the military, and 
contain serious dilemmas for democratic civilians. Because of this, many 
regimes have experienced a long period of incomplete military 
extrication. 53 
Incomplete withdrawal is a situation in which the military has 
transferred government responsibility to civilians but retains ambitions 
and significant power sources to threaten the new civilian authority. It 
reflects demilitarization of the government while maintaining the 
militarization of the political system (Rouquie 1 98 7 : 3 75 ) .  The 
fundamental change in the military's  political perception is scarcely 
recognized at this stage. At the height of its rule, the military rejected 
participatory democracy for the achievement of 'national objectives' as 
determined by professional officers. When faced with democratic 
pressures later, the military relaxed its political control or, in other words, 
deregulated the political market. 54 The decision to extricate itself was 
most unlikely to have been the outcome of the military's commitment to 
civil-society values; extrication is more likely to have been seen as the 
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safest way to restore the internal cohesion of the military . Nunn 
( 1995 : 27) concludes that Latin American officers under the civilian 
authority still endanger (re )democratization, as they view the growing 
civilian political culture as a threat to military nationalism and to 
'national values'. When threatened, he continues, they tend to fall back on 
tradition, national values, geopolitics, and national security to justify their 
continued existence. The reality of imperfect withdrawal has led many 
scholars to conclude that it is 'prerogatives '  retained by the military 
which have left civil-military relations unchanged in essence and have 
hindered civilian governments in their efforts to consolidate new 
democratic regimes.55 The 'prerogative approach' has become a major 
tool for analyzing the problems of incomplete extrication. 
However, this approach essentially assumes the status quo. Is it true 
that civil-military relations have not advanced? If so, can we deduce an 
explanation exclusively from the fact that the military still 'holds' these 
prerogatives, as Zaverucha ( 1 993) insists? Explaining the scope and 
depth of prerogatives can certainly help us understand the perceived 
corporate interests of the military, but we should note that these 
prerogatives are not identical with military influence in politics. What is 
more crucial is the 'using' of the prerogatives. For example, in ABRI's 
case, what makes ABRI influential in the legislative process is not the 
holding of the prerogative, i.e. appointed military seats in the parliament 
(DPR), but the lobbying of the ABRI Fraction in the DPR (F-ABRI). If F­
ABRI does nothing, the prerogative is not a source of influence. 
Similarly, kekaryaan (sending officers to non-military positions) is a 
prerogative of ABRI (officers instead call it ' service' )  but it has to be 
'used' effectively in order to control politics .  If ABRI merely has such a 
prerogative but lacks resources, legitimacy, and capacity, the intended 
purpose of the prerogative cannot be achieved. In this sense, the 
prerogative approach-which analyses ' condition s '  rather than 
'process '-does not allow us to draw conclusions about the actual 
military influence in the polity. 
The status quo assumption of the prerogative approach is challenged 
by scholars who favour the political-process approach. Fitch ( 1986), for 
example, argues that the recreation of political space and the diminished 
threat of violent repression has encouraged the re-politicization of 
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previously demobilized civilian sectors more rapidly and explosively than 
anticipated by most regimes.  Despite the efforts of military leaders to 
control the selection of their civilian successors, the return to elections has 
typically produced unwanted results which cannot be repudiated. 
Similarly, Wendy Hunter's rational-actor approach leads her to conclude 
that: 'over time, democratically elected politicians have successfully 
contested the power of the military over a broad range of issues and 
narrowed its sphere of influence' (Hunter 1995:427).56 Civil-military 
relations, therefore, are not static. The structure may remain the same, but 
the rules of the political game are constantly changing. Although the 
civilian authority may face difficulties in prosecuting military officers for 
past human-rights abuses, and may allow the military to retain its 
politicized professional missions, this does not mean that incomplete 
withdrawal results in political decay. The two most common dilemmas for 
the new civilian authority are no doubt critical to the politics of civil­
military relations, but they are not everything. The practice of antipolitics 
is no longer legitimate and democratic civilians freely compete to 
mobilize the masses. 
In sum, as with our earlier discussion of structure-action (S-A) 
approaches to the understanding of extrication, the condition-process 
approaches in the analysis of incomplete withdrawals should not be seen 
as contradictory but as complementary in explaining different aspects of 
the same event. A problem emerges only when one approach oversteps 
into the territory of the other and tries to generalize about the entire 
event. Such an 'obtrusive' conclusion may cloud the original merit of 
the approach. In analyzing dilemmas of incomplete extrication, this 
problem has to be remembered. We have seen that past human rights 
abuse by the military pose a major dilemma. But, does this allow us to 
say-as Huntington and others say-that making human rights abuses a 
non-issue is a prerequisite for successful transition? It can be argued that 
if the military is divided during the transition, human rights issues can be 
used by military softliners to purge the hardliners, which may smooth the 
transition . 57 In Indonesia's transition from the Soeharto to the post­
Soeharto regime, past human-rights issues were used in purging officers 
close to Lt-Gen Prabowo, a core hardline officer who is Soeharto's son­
in-law, and in consolidating the new ABRI leadership under Gen Wiranto. 
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Crafting internal-external doctrinal transformations 
We have examined major issue-areas of military extrication and 
concluded that : ( 1 )  our doctrinal focus provides a middle-range 
perspective to fill the gap between structural and action explanations; (2) 
neither intervention-level nor cultural descriptions sufficiently cover the 
problem of the blurred politico-military boundary set by doctrines; (3) 
the degree of professionalization may influence the extrication pattern, 
but is less likely to be its primary motivation (this is evident when the 
military is unwilling to be apolitical after the disengagement) and ( 4) 
civilian dilemmas about reducing military prerogatives are discernible, 
but they do not determine the entire civil-military power balance-the 
growing domain of civilian initiatives leaves the military unable to use 
certain prerogatives in the political process. Based on these assessments, 
this final section brings the DSN back into our discussion and examines 
the ideological-institutional problem of doctrinal transformation in 
consolidating political control of the military.58 Broadly speaking, the 
doctrinal transformation has two dimensions--external and internal. 
External transformation is concerned with the relative (or absolute) shift 
of military roles in society. Its focus is on military missions. Internal 
transformation refers to the change in corporate military perception and 
thought. We will consider these two dimensions-missions and thought­
as the target of doctrinal reform for democratic civilians who endeavour 
to subordinate the military to government authority. 
External transformation 
To begin with missions:  current scholarship seems to have reached a 
grand consensus that the military' s political duties under the DSN should 
be removed from the scope of professional military missions. In addition 
to military control of formal political institutions, the DSN also provided 
a rationale for the use of military intelligence to conduct missions quite 
different from those associated with external defence, for example 
infiltrating businesses, universities,  labour unions and political parties. 59 It 
is not enough for the new government to prohibit these activities if the 
military retains incentives to engage in them. The 'loss of mission' may 
32 
simply confuse the military profession and stimulate its political 
reintervention. As seen earlier, what is said to be important is the 
provision of alternative but credible missions which do not harm 
democratic life. 
Welch ( 1987 :22-23) suggests that physical movement of troops to 
border areas, or outside the country for international peace-keeping 
efforts, facilitates transformation. According to him, the 'appropriate' 
mission would include relatively limited direct involvement in internal 
development or civic action.60 In regard to limited involvement in 
development projects ,  O'Donnell and Schmitter ( 1986:32) cynically state 
that the military's role in running state and parastate enterprises can be 
useful in occupying the time and interests of officers who might 
otherwise find little else to do. Even at the risk of increasing the danger­
and cost-of corruption, it exposes those officers to a range of non­
military contacts wider than those provided by the unavoidable civilian 
'coup-inducers' .  Except for the latter, which merely tries to keep the 
military out of political activity, these proposals are all aimed at 
redirecting the military's professional missions. 
Problems are easily found in both reality and theoretical assumption. 
The former raises the question of feasibility and the latter focuses on the 
dubious linkage between these missions and military depoliticization. The 
feasibility problem can be seen, for example, in Brazil. There, although 
civilian leaders considered shifting the military orientation to external 
defence missions, at the same time they knew that such missions were not 
necessary in post Cold War Latin America, where social and economic 
issues loom large. Under these circumstances, President Pranco has 
guided the military to expand its civic-mission programs since 1992; 
because deploying troops for civic action is far less costly than training 
them for external missions. However, this tends to aggravate civil-military 
tensions because the officer corps regards the civic-mission role as less 
appropriate for soldiers who are professionally trained for national 
security. 61 A simple but important question here is: why are its corporate 
interests thought to be threatened? A part of the answer lies on the 
officers' growing sense of gap and distortion between their role 
perceptions and newly assigned missions. Arranging new missions does 
not solve the fundamental problem if the military retains the mental 
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legacy of the DSN. This leads to the second issue-the assumption that 
new missions may distance the military from politics. 
In the post Cold War international environment, new missions are no 
doubt helpful to give credible and honourable roles to the professional 
militaries with a civilian-control philosophy. It is, however, too early to 
expect the same outcome in the case of professional militaries with the 
DSN legacy . Their perceptional universe may even identify these 
missions as a source of strengthening commitment to their long-term 
doctrinal beliefs, resulting in a growing gap between their self-image and 
the real situation. The case of ABRI-a professional military with the 
dwifungsi mentality-may contribute to the understanding of this. 
ABRI has been involved in peace-keeping missions organized by the 
United Nations since 1957. Its troops-called Garuda Contingents-have 
been deployed to various places seventeen times, half of them during the 
1 990s. Officers like Lieutenant-General Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Brigadier-General Edi Budianto earned good reputations for their 
leadership during such operations. 62 For ABRI, involvement in peace­
keeping missions not only provides a rationale for its active participation 
in the international community and for maintaining its 'professional' 
capacity judged by international standards,  but also reinforces ABRI's 
long-term commitment to dwifungsi practices. When asked about his 
experience in Cambodia, a navy intellectual, Rear Admiral Kustia, insisted 
that: 
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[O]ne reason why ABRI earned a high reputation among foreign military 
observers was that it was only ABRI personnel who got closer to the 
rakyat [people] in Cambodia. Other foreign soldiers asked the local 
people not to come inside the fence of their camps. Our soldiers were the 
opposite. They welcomed locals to visit them and sometimes gave 
medicines which were prepared for their own use . . . .  Although other 
foreigners were surprised, it was not something special for ABRI 
because they had been trained with dwifungsi and AMD (civic action 
program). They just did what they had done in Indonesia. ABRI's motto 
is that 'what is good for the rakyat is what is good for ABRI.' Our 
experience in Cambodia showed that the dwifungsi mission was 
universally applicable.63 
Similarly, Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, who was involved in the 
Cambodia mission, recalled that: 
Success in Cambodia was the product of dwifungsi which trained 
soldiers with the spirit of professionalism and self-dedication. Giving 
medicines to the local people is a common activity designed by Opster 
[territorial operations] . We just used it in Cambodia and we just got 
high reputation. There is nothing special. 64 
ABRI's participation in peace-keeping missions has demonstrated its 
professional capacity to international society, but has not revealed any 
contradiction between internal and external security missions. Indeed, the 
peace-keeping mission encourages ABRI to retain its traditional political 
doctrine. Military thinkers can argue that dwifungsi missions have proved 
ABRI' s appropriateness in the international arena, and thus reinforce the 
process of dwifungsi re-legitimation. 
ABRI's civic missions have similar effects. They include disaster 
relief, family planning, reforestation, rural food productivity, and more 
broadly defined socio-cultural development (The White Book:48-54 ). 
There is no doubt that these civic missions have contributed to the 
improvement of national life, but along with their overt purposes, these 
missions have provided ABRI with a constant basis for the internal 
socialization of its messianic self-perception. Regarding civic missions, 
the 1995 White Book insisted that ABRI was not influenced by cultural­
based peculiarities but was united in its nationalism. ABRI officers, 
therefore, were in a good position to assist the government in maintaining 
social harmony (ibid. :54) . This perception easily translates into the idea 
that ABRI is an agent of national integration and modernization, while 
civilians are self-interested; or that ABRI dedicates itself to the national 
interest, while civilians care only about their sectional interests . Needless 
to say, these organizational self-images have been at the core of dwifungsi 
legitimation and therefore have motivated broader political activities .  
Under these circumstances, the peace-keeping and civic missions may 
be ineffective in keeping the military out of politics .  Rather, it is highly 
probable that if the mission shift is attempted by civilians, the officers' 
messianic self-image will identify the gap between their broad national 
concerns and the limited role given to them. This may open the officers' 
35 
eyes to the civilians' inability to protect the 'national interest' and their 
lack of understanding of the military' s competence to do so. Such a 
perception encourages military resentment towards the civilian authority, 
as in the case of Brazil. The argument that external warfare, border 
defence, peace-keeping and civic actions provide alternative professional 
missions to secure military non-intervention thus cannot be accepted 
without substantial reservation. 65 The argument only becomes relevant 
where the military does not see any serious contradiction between its self­
image and the reality. Perhaps it is limited to professional militaries which 
are inspired by the civilian-control doctrine.66 
Internal transformation 
This is not to deny the significance of mission transformation, but to 
insist on its likely failure if not accompanied by internal doctrinal 
transformation, that is, counterbalancing the military's  self-image as 
embodied in the DSN or dwifungsi. This transformation is crucial in the 
process of democratic transition in order to prevent the military from 
developing an interpretation of democratization which is quite different 
from that of the civilian authority. The gap in civil-military perceptions 
becomes an impediment to formulating the target and means of 
democratic reform-including the degree of military extrication and the 
assignment of alternative military missions. 
In the case of Brazil, according to Stepan ( 1 98 8 :50-5 1 ) , the 
professional military, with the mental legacy of the DSN, accepted that 
democratization was a necessary process but believed that it required 
' self-guards '  (or control mechanisms) in order to be accomplished. The 
interpretation of national security was tactically adapted to emphasize its 
leading role in promoting the 'principle of self-defence of democracy' . 
In this process, the military attempted to neutralize the emerging political 
opposition-the legitimate expression of dissenting opinion about 
government policy-labelling it as 'contestation' ,  and seeing it as a 
systematic attack on the regime itself and thus illegitimate and subject to 
repression according to the self-defence principle. Similarly , in 
Indonesia, the military-which accepted the need for democratization­
developed techniques to neutralize the democratic pressure which 
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emerged under the late New Order regime. Dwifungsi employed the 
kewaspadaan (latent threat) approach, which incorporated the concept of 
globalization as a threat inviting foreign political ideas, in order to 
delegitimize the opposition in the name of defending the principle of 
Pancasila democracy. 67 
In these circumstances, the core aspect of military thinking is the 
fusion of the sanctified image of 'national interests ' and messianic self­
role perception. The nation is recognized as an organic entity whose 
interests are embodied in the state in which the government handles its 
daily activities while the military-as a national representative-is 
expected to be the 'direct' guardian of the sacred national interest.68 This 
set of perceptions, which motivates the military to ignore the government, 
is the target of internal doctrinal transformation. In this regard, Zagorski 
( 1992:82) insists that 'the strategy includes the redefinition of armed 
forces' sphere of competence, [so] as to induce them to alter both their 
technical and nationalist conceptions ' .  Reformers,  he continues, must 
promote a view of nationalism that links loyalty to the nation with loyalty 
to the democratic regime. This idea resonates with Stepan's ( 1 988:  143-
45) assessment of educational problems in the Brazilian military. He 
relates how, in the war college courses, social and political conflicts were 
not accepted as a constituent element of a democracy. The recurrent 
assumption was that conflicts are dangerous.  The DSN implanted a 
perspective of the state as the agent for structuring civil and political 
society so as to dissuade the articulation of conflict where possible, and to 
repress such articulation when necessary. Thus, Stepan continues, the 
democratic leadership of the state has to play a role in creating new 
doctrines of national defence that provide positive alternatives to these 
ideas and should include a curriculum with more serious attention by 
social scientists to the inevitable role of conflict in any polity. 
Limiting the professional sphere of competence ,  reorienting the 
content of nationalism, and introducing the idea that political conflicts 
are needed for a viable political system are, therefore, considered 
necessary for transforming military thinking under democratic transition. 
The question thus becomes how civilians can initiate this process of 
internal transformation. The institutional redesigning of civil-military 
burden-sharing is central to this. Stepan (ibid . :  144-45), for example, 
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suggests the need for establishing new national-defence colleges . under a 
c ivilian Minister of Defence and the systematic professional 
incorporation of the military into a civilian-led national-security council. 
For him, the latter may reduce the military's sense of isolation, create a 
more effective system of mutual exchange of information and grievances, 
and thus enhance the capacity for democratic control .  69 Zagorski 
( 1992: 83) further insists on the need for consensus-within the council­
that doctrinal change does not assume civil-military politics to be a zero­
sum game and presupposes mutual dialogue about national security and 
the military's role in attaining it. The next step, according to him, is to 
institutionalize civil-military burden-sharing in formulating four layers of 
military doctrine, namely, the grand strategy, strategy, tactics and 
policy.70 
The significance here is that the civilian authority is expected to have 
full control over 'entrance' and 'exit, ' i .e .  grand strategy and policy, 
while the military retains autonomy in the two fields in the middle. This 
division of labour is considered to be helpful in neutralizing DSN 
thinking and institutionalizing check mechanisms. Programs designed for 
the internal transformation of military doctrine are expected to reduce 
the perceived gap between new missions and the military's self-image, 
and, in effect, smooth the process of external transformation in the long­
run .7 1 
ABRI and civilians: establishing the procedure? 
Based on this assessment, what can be said about ABRI's possible path to 
internal transformation? We have discussed four major procedures: 
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( 1 )  shrinking the professional sphere of competence; 
( 2)  revising the content of nationalism; 
(3)  socializing the idea that political conflicts are normal, and indeed 
necessary, for any stable polity; and 
(4) institutionalizing civil-military burden-sharing in formulating 
the defence-security framework. 
These programs seem to be applicable to ABRI's case too, though, of 
course, special attention should be paid to Indonesian particularities. The 
following discussion considers procedural direction rather than the 
program's contemporary feasibility. 
Concerning ( 1 ) ,  ABRI's professional commitment has involved 
dwifungsi management. Limiting this ultimately means clearly 
demarcating the defence and political fields and having ABRI personnel 
retreat from all political assignments. But even, say, confining and 
auditing the role of intelligence may greatly shrink ABRI's professional 
competence in influencing daily political life, because information is the 
dynamo of professional military operations.  Therefore, reforms might 
involve the establishment of an intra-military norm that sees domestic 
intelligence-such as surveillance of labour movements and campus life, 
as well as the manipulation of political party affairs-as a deviation from 
the professional criteria of the security apparatus. 
Regarding (2) and (3), the role of Pancasila must be considered. 
Although this vague national ideology was frequently used as an 
exclusive doctrine against regime critics under the Soeharto regime, its 
literal content recognizes social plurality and harmony. It can therefore 
be utilized by future civilian leaders to induce ABRI to review its 
perception in such a way as to recognize political conflict as a necessary 
aspect of the political process-not as a threat to security. Such reform 
requires two steps:  (a) fortifying an explicit interpretation of Pancasila 
that does not see political conflict as a threat to national unity; and (b) 
(re)defining the relationship between ABRI's role and Pancasila. The first 
of these steps should be accomplished exclusively by civilian initiatives, 
while the second can be left to ABRI's .72 Once the political use of 
Pancasila is to a certain extent confined, ABRI's commitment to the 
nationalist symbols (Pancasila and UUD45) is less likely to become a 
source of political repression. 
Finally, (4) refers to civilian involvement in the formation of the 
defence-security framework and burden-sharing at each doctrinal level. 
In the current Indonesian context, the National Defence Security Council 
(Wanhankamnas)-a presidential advisory body-may be identified as 
the place to initiate doctrinal change at the top level. This inevitably 
requires its functional expansion-from the current one of formulating 
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the 5-Year Defence Policy Outline-under civilian initiative. Appointing 
civilians to the posts of Defence Minister, Coordinating Minister for 
Political and Security Affairs, and Minister for Interior and Lemhannas 
governor also falls within the scope of new institutional designing. In 
terms of doctrinal revision, both Wawasan Nusantara and Ketahanan 
Nasional-as grand strategies--can become civilian fields with military 
advice, while the middle-range strategy based on Hankamrata is left for 
military autonomy. In policy implementation, the Council could oversee 
policies at the national level-for example, kekaryaan, F-ABRI, dispatch 
of special forces, and defence intelligence-whereas at the regional level, 
the conduct of various territorial operations could become subject to the 
governor's authority. By controlling 'entrance and exit' , the future 
civilian authority may initiate the internal transformation which is needed 
for civilians to neutralize ABRI's distorted political views based on the 
' latent threat' perspective. Justification and implementation of this 
political alarmism embodied in dwifungsi can, to a large extent, be 
regulated by the initiatives of democratic civilians to redefine military 
threats at the level of grand strategy and prevent such operations at the 
policy level. 
ABRI's political extrication is of course a different question. Up till 
now, ABRI has not indicated a wish to totally disengage from politics .  
What is publicly advocated by some officers is  the need for dwifungsi 
adjustment. However, when/if the time of the generals passes away in the 
near future, Indonesia's civil-military relations will enter a transition phase 
like that in many of the DSN-inspired states discussed above. There are 
many ways in which dwifangsi may be adjusted or even abandoned, but 
all will involve the four procedures of internal transformation noted 
above in order to eliminate the doctrinal basis of possible military re­
intervention and to incorporate ABRI into the process of regime 
democratization. 
Notes 
See, for example, Crouch ( 1997:207-235) . 2 Pancasila is a set of five national principles declared by Soekarno in 1945. It 
consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy 
based on consultation and consensus, and social justice. 
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Among various cross-national comparative strategies, Riggs ( 1994) provides a 
useful framework which focuses on formal political concepts that are used 
homogeneously in different countries but implemented heterogeneously. Using 
the concept of presidentialism, his work systematically integrates the variants of 
presidential regimes and generalizes the patterns of country-particular reflections. 
Our analysis follows his model. 
On the political and economic background of the DSN, see Calvo's excellent 
summary ( 1979:69-72). 
Ibid.: 73. 
ABRI's geopolitical concept is exemplified in Wawasan Nusantara, (the 
Archipelago Concept) and its geostrategy in Ketahanan Nasional (National 
Resilience). Both are explained as absolute values in defining Indonesia's defence 
environment objectively. See, for example, ABRI's first Defence White Paper 
published in 1995 (Department of Defence and Security, The Policy of State 
Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta: Department of 
Defence and Security, 1995, pp. 12- 15. Hereafer The White Paper). For the 
'scientific' and 'technical' approach to Ketahanan Nasional, Lemhannas (the 
National Defence Institute) produced mathematical and socio-technological 
models, as seen in Bunga Rampai Ketahanan Nasional ( Konsepsi & Teori), 
Himpunan Lemhannas, Jakarta: PT Ripres Utama, 1980, chapters 48, 49. 
Pion-Berlin puts equal weight on the influence of French and US armies in the 
formulation of DSN. Nunn ( 1995 :6) argues, however, that the basic doctrinal 
model was French although encouraged by the US army. 
Dwifungsi identifies lpoleksosbudmil as the scope of military engagement. 
Among dwifungsi theorists too, Clausewitz's famous aphorism has frequently 
been employed, for example in Notosusanto ( 1984:208). Here Clausewitz's 
thesis is similarly misinterpreted or manipulated. The DSN and dwifungsi 
advocates use the dictum to conclude that military and political matters cannot be 
distinguished, thus the military should have a say in politics. However, 
Clausewitz's own intent was to argue that it is politics that controls the military, 
not the other way around. 
Loveman ( 1997 : 138-139). On the ideological premises for such constitutional 
settings, see also Pion-Berlin ( 1989b) which examines cases in Argentina and 
Peru. 
O'Donnell's influential book, published in the same year as Stepan's article, 
endorsed the politicization impact of professionalism by using the case of 
Argentina. He argued that enhanced military professionalization had two effects: 
( 1) raising the threshold of political turmoil that would result in systematic 
military intervention in politics; and (2) encouraging a far greater degree of 
political involvement by the military (O'Donnell 1973: 166). 
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12 For a description of the historical development of professionalism in the 
Brazilian military, see also Nunn ( 1983). 
13 Markoff and Baretta ( 1985 : 179, 1 82). They also support Nunn's study which 
emphasizes continuity rather than change, by insisting that one of the roots of 
the military activism of the 1920s throughout Latin America was the growing 
professionalism of the armed forces. 14 According to organization theory, this coexistence of competing perspectives is 
due to the fact that, in the early stage of institutional transformation, the 
transaction cost of altering an entire system is so large that it demands a cushion 
by selectively introducing new values into the established system. See Powell 
and DiMaggio ( 1991:4). 15 Markoff and Baretta ( 1985: 1 86) admit that Brazilian officers in the 1930s often 
regarded internal security as an unprofessional mission. 16 Apart from these main points, McCann (1979:506) doubts the relevance of 'new' 
professionalism, since the 'old' one is not applicable to pre- 1960s Brazil. He 
says that 'Stepan marshalled his data so adroitly that one nearly forgets to ask if 
the first premise is correct. Does Huntington's description of the "old 
professionalism" apply to the Brazilian army?' However, this criticism is weak 
because Stepan never claimed that old professionalism fitted the Brazilian 
military. He uses Huntington's thesis in order to contrast it with his new idea 
derived from his examination of changing patterns in Brazil and Peru. If Stepan 
is to be criticized in terms of old professionalism, a point should be made, 
instead, about his 'acceptance' of Huntington's paradigm in building his theory. 
Stepan's concept of new professionalism is the antithesis of Huntington's 
professionalism but this undermines the coherence of a causal relationship 
between professionalism and politicization, because Huntington does not 
envisage the possibility that 'external' security concerns also facilitate military 
politicization. Needless to say, the strategy of total warfare which mobilizes all 
national resources for external defence frequently leads to military politicization. 
Our Indonesian case is an excellent example. However, again, this is a criticism 
linked only to Step 3. 
17 However, as seen in Nunn's description above, it is more accurate to say that 
Brazilian officers inspired by the DSN see themselves 'above' politicians and 
bureaucrats. 1 8  The classical debate is as follows. Against Huntington ( 1957:84) , who argues 
that 'a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of 
any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state' , Finer 
( 1962:25-27) argues that professionalism cultivates a high sense of nationalism 
among the officer corps that may encourage an interventionist orientation. 
Janowitz ( 1964:40-49) also insists that professionalization promotes officers' 
administrative capacity with the result that skill differentiation between military 
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and political management becomes blurred, in the eyes of officers, leading to the 
development of an interventionist military in the developing countries. 
Moreover, Abrahamsson ( 1972 : 17- 1 8) ,  from an organizational theory 
perspective, argues that professionalization strengthens the military's sense of 
corporate interests and may facilitate military intervention in politics once 
threatened by civilian politics. Sarkesian's ( 1984) vivid comparison of 
Huntington and Janowitz minimizes their differences but stresses their 
complementary nature in many respects. Needless to say, it is impossible to 
deduce from the degree of professionalism an explanation for political 
commitment without assessing the country's political environment. However, 
understanding how the process of professionalization influences the political 
orientation of the military itself is still a significant task in political science. 
19 As if avoiding a claim of historical continuity, Stepan emphasizes that the Latin 
American military came to redefine its mission primarily in terms of dealing 
with threats to internal security, especially after the defeat of the conventional 
army in Cuba by Castro's guerrilla force. Then, highly professionalized 
militaries in Brazil and Peru developed doctrines and training techniques to 
prevent or crush insurgent movements, leading to a focusing of energies on the 
'professionalization' of their approach to internal security and national 
development. See Stepan ( 1973:50-51). These processes should be seen as a 
whole in order to defend Stepan's thesis from criticism based on the historical 
perspective. 
20 MacFarling's study of dwifungsi argues that ABRI is an instructive example of 
new professionalism because 'officers are members of a cohesive, well trained 
organization that has focused its corporate energies on achieving and maintaining 
national stability' ( 1996: 188). This view identifies a phenomenal similarity but 
does not pay attention to any causal relationship in Steps 1-3. If the military is 
simply professional and plays the role of national stabilizer, it rather fits Finer's 
old model. 21 See also Atkins ( 1997: 168- 169) . It does not mean that regime repression was 
'soft' in Peru, but reflects a general feeling that geopolitics is a primary military 
concern while development is a social matter. 
22 In the countries of the Southern Cone, a dominant interpretation emerged in the 
1970s which asserted that groups which failed to uphold 'Western Christian 
values' were the active, or unwitting, accomplices of subversive forces trying to 
undermine noncommunist regimes and attack the moral and spiritual foundations 
of the nation. For details, see Fitch ( 1993:23-24). Fitch's article provides an 
excellent description of the detailed process whereby foreign doctrines were 
introduced and localized in Latin America. 
23 T he regime was the revolutionary military government headed by General Juan 
Velasco Alvarado between 1968 and 1975. Velasco's revolutionary projects 
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involved land reform and nationalization of enterprises in several industrial 
sectors. For successes and failures of the left-wing DSN projects under Velasco, 
see Lowenthal ( 1975) and McClintock and Lowenthal ( 1983) . Becker ( 1982) 
stresses the rise of the 'new bourgeoisie' under the regime, although its structural 
dependence on the state prevented the emergence of liberal-democratic ideology 
among the new middle class. 
Stepan ( 1978: 144-146) argues that none of the key radical officers who initiated 
the reform project was a graduate of CAEM. All, however, had strong 
connections with the intelligence sector which had investigated several corruption 
cases linking local elites and foreign actors during the previous Belaunde 
administration. Philip ( 1980:427-429) suggests that CAEM graduates were 
instead prominent in the technocratic faction that supported reform from above, 
but opposed mass mobilization in support of those reforms. 
25 The prestigious Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared called the 
DSN 'the doctrine behind the repression' in the country. See Pion-Berlin 
( 1988:383) . It is said that 8,960 people disappeared under the regime. In Brazil, 
125 people disappeared while in Uruguay the number was 25 (Stepan 1988:70). 26 Kopkamtib (the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and 
Order), an extra-judicial military agency, had been ABRI's major tool of internal 
security activities, including the ideological screening of party candidates and 
government employees, elimination of communist remnants, and suppression of 
campus and labour activists. This agency was replaced by Bakorstanas 
(Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability) in 1988, which 
inherited many of these internal security tasks. 27 Kopassus received training from the US; training of Kopassus officers also took 
place in Australia. 28 More precisely, Latin American militaries, with few exceptions (e.g. Venezuela 
and Mexico), traditionally believed that they-as 'guardians' of national 
interests-had a legitimate short-term political role when these interests were 
threatened in crises where civilian institutions were weak, fragmented and 
ineffectual (Fitch 1993:2 1) .  See also Bacchus's ( 1985) work which analyses the 
ideological basis of this orthodox short-term intervention by the Brazilian army 
and the rise of disputes when it adopted a long-term version after the Brazilian 
revolution in 1964. 29 This assessment owns much to Giddens' inspiring work ( 1987) which describes 
how the development of administrative technology in the modem state changed 
the definition of social 'deviance' and adapted the modes of its surveillance and 
control. See especially chapters 7, 8, and 12. 
3 0  We limit our argument here to the impact of doctrine on the political activism of 
the military. Needless to say, however, political orientation cannot be explained 
solely by doctrine or ideology. Zagorski ( 1992:54,72-74) argues that the DSN 
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provided a ready rationale to legitimize permanent military involvement. But he 
does not clarify what role the developmentalist ideology had in this. 
3 1 Interview with Ali Sadikin, 30 July 1996; written interview with Gen (ret) A.H. 
Nasution, 4 January 1997. 
32 The testing of this hypothesis would require relational analysis of educational 
programs and officers' perceptions. It could be conducted, for example, by 
observing quantitative-qualitative changes in education materials in Seskoad and 
matching them with content analysis of officers' writings. 
33 The most prominent cases were Ecuador's General Guillermo Rodiguez Lara, 
Argentina's General Levingston, and Bolivia's General Juan Pereda Asblln. The 
overthrow of Preda was plotted by what was called 'the generational group' 
within the military, a set of younger officers, academy trained, more 
professionally oriented, who were tired of the continual factionalism and political 
meddling of the top echelons of the officer corps (ibid.: 618). 
34 Application of game theory, for instance by Przeworski ( 1992), represents a 
distinct challenge to the structural approach. On the contest between the 
structural and contingent analyses, see, for example, Bratoon and van de Walle 
( 1997: 19-27). 
35 The relationship between economic change and the military has been a 
controversial issue. Jose Nun's ( 1970:329) classic thesis-first presented in 
1967-insists that professional armies in Latin America have middle-class 
origins and have acted as representatives of middle-class interests, compensating 
for that class's inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group. 
Huntington ( 1968:222) elaborates this insight and concludes that the military's 
historic role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it to the lower 
class. However, this Nun-Huntington hypothesis does not show how the officers 
of middle-class origin protect middle-class political demands such as for wider 
political participation and freedom of the mass media. Regarding Indonesia, there 
is also an argument that dwifungsi's claim to be a social dynamizer, a middle­
class value (Indonesia Reports [Political Supplement], No. 19, December 1986, 
pp.7-8). However, ABRI generally views the rise of the middle class as a 
political threat undermining Pancasila values. Apart from the middle-class 
argument, Putnam's ( 1967:97) quantitative cross-national analysis stresses that 
socio-economic mobilization in general undermines the military's role in 
politics, because it may increase the number of political actors and diffuse 
political resources available to the military. Huntington ( 1968: Chapter 1), on 
the contrary, argues that, as social mobility increases, the political system may 
fail to absorb social demands, resulting in political disorder which invites 
praetorian military intervention. O'Donnell's ( 1973) influential study concludes 
that the most likely consequences of modernization (with high social mobility) 
in Latin America are bureaucratic-authoritarian military regimes, due to the 
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increasing demand for wage repression to encourage capitalist economic growth. 
Ruhl ( 1982), who retested Putnam's analytical indicators, also rejected Putnam's 
thesis on empirical grounds. More recently, Danopoulos ( 1988:4) insists on the 
positive correlation between high levels of socio-economic development and the 
degree to which the military is disposed to let go of political power. But a causal 
relationship is not provided here. 
36 Welch ( 1993:75,86,88) argues that civil-military relations in Third World 
countries are facing serious fundamental challenges due to the collapse of the 
Second World in 1989. The collapse of communist regimes affected the Third 
World through diminished military aid and greater emphasis on peace-keeping. 
The legitimacy of military rule may also be undermined by the loss of rationale 
in the form of the threat of international communism. 
37 Skocpol ( 1985:21) suggests that 'organizational configurations, along with their 
overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of 
group formation and collective political actions, and make possible the raising of 
certain political issues'.  In civil-military relations, the structure-action (S-A) 
interaction was presented, for example, by Suh ( 1987: Chapter 2). However, his 
model presents the S-A flow in a simple linear direction, excluding the feedback 
process (how actions regulate actors and structure) . One of the influential works 
which successfully included the feedback loop in S-A analysis was Giddens' 
( 1987) 'structuration theory'. However, one criticism of structuration theory is 
its lack of attention to the role of intermediators in the process by which 
individual actions influence the structural reconfiguration. See Thompson's 
( 1989) perceptive work on evaluation and criticism of structuration theory. In 
more recent civil-military relations studies, the S-A issue is often presented in 
terms of organization-behaviour interaction. See Crouch ( 1997) for an attempt to 
analyze the interaction of organizational structure, ideology, culture, and political 
behaviour in comparing Southeast Asian militaries' reactions to democratization. 
38 See O'Neil ( 1996) and Bratton and Walle ( 1997 :4 1-45) who employ this neo­
institutional approach in their analysis of democratic transition. Bratton and 
Walle argue that it can overcome the major weakness of the contingency 
approach to democratization, that is 'excessive voluntarism' which creates a 
problem of 'presentism '-by heavily discounting the past-and a lack of 
predictive power as a comparative political theory. Both these studies are 
strongly inspired by the study of DiMaggio and Powell. For an excellent 
overview of 'new institutionalism' and its differences with 'old' studies of 
political institutions, a recent work by Selznick ( 1996) , who is labelled by 
DiMaggio and Powell as a representative of the 'old institutionalists,' is helpful. 
The term 'institution' does not refer to formal organization, but is defined as 'a 
social order or pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process and owes its 
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survival to relatively self-activating social process'. This includes, for example, 
rituals, cultures, ideologies, laws and social beliefs. See Jepperson ( 1991 : 145). 
39 A similar assessment is presented in Stepan ( 1986:77). 
40 Hanneman's ( 1985) cross-national quantitative measuring of the level of 
intervention shows that existing typologies of the military role in politics are 
insufficiently detailed. 41 Tut wuri handayani is a Javanese expression descri ving how a father supports his 
young children from behind as they learn to walk. This is one of ABRI's 
leadership principles frequently argued in the face of growing social demands for 
regime opening. 42 
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A similar problem can be found in the study of democratization in general, which 
tries to categorize the level of democracy or the degree of authoritarianism in 
developing countries, by using a continuum between democracy and 
authoritarianism. Several concepts such as pseudo-democratic, semi-democratic, 
soft-authoritarian are placed along the continuum but, viewed from a country­
specific stance, some cases show that democratic-authoritarian, or 'responsive­
repressive' characteristics are not contradictory but mutually supportive for 
regime maintenance. See Crouch ( 1996: Chapter 1) which advocates this 
perspective by examining the case of Malaysia. 
King, Keohane and Verba's brilliant study suggests that the concept of culture 
can be a hindrance to empirical evaluation of theories and hypotheses. Therefore 
it should be avoided in constructing causal theories. For details, see King, 
Keohane and Verba ( 1994:99- 1 14). A similar evaluation can be applied to 
Huntington's ( 1984:2 10) interesting argument that: 'countries that have 
relatively stable authoritarian rule are more likely to evolve into relatively stable 
democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and 
democracy. In the latter, neither democracy nor authoritarian norms have deep 
roots among the political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting 
authoritarian norms is displaced by broad consensus on or acceptance of 
democratic ones'. Here, 'consensus' and 'norms' are treated as independent 
variables, but, like culture, they are too abstract and unobservable to form the 
basis of a concrete causal hypothesis. Another case is Pinkney's ( 1990: 163) 
cross-national study which concludes that, with few exceptions, right-wing 
military regimes have generally fewer objections in principle to withdrawing 
from politics than those on the left. This is not a cultural approach, but an 
example of using unclear independent variables. 44 Here, professional mission refers to external defence tasks. 45 For a similar assessment, see Lissak's ( 1976: 19) classic study of Third World 
military role-expansion. 46 We can rephrase Danopoulos's above quotation as follows. 'The motivation to 
stop playing politics refers to a situation in which the military becomes 
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convinced that the time has come to return to an apolitical military' . The right 
question here is why the military wishes to be apolitical, and the answer to this 
becomes the motivation to withdraw. A similar problem can be found more 
generally in the literature-for instance, Finer ( 1983)-which emphasises 
'preconditions' for military withdrawal-such as presence of alternative civilians 
and the need for civil-military pacts. These 'prerequisites' are treated as factors of 
extrication, but they are also the consequences of withdrawal; thus one ends up 
saying that civilianization needs civilians. Among many criticisms of this 
'precondition approach' to military extrication, see Pion-Berlin ( 1995) for one 
suggesting its tautological nature. 
47 Soeharto insisted on 22 July 1993 that: 'ABRI's political participation was 
intended to involve ABRI in the policy-making process in order to avoid a 
situation where ABRI might raise their guns against unwelcome policies' . 
48 The concept of 'government responsibility' is borrowed from Sundhaussen 
( 1984) . Although he himself does not emphasize it, the concept greatly 
contributes to the study of Third World military politics. It gives us an analytical 
lens to examine the military which has given up government control but still 
plays a very active role in the process of political decision making-a 
phenomenon which cannot be covered by the dichotomous view of withdrawal 
and intervention. 
49 Prosecution is especially important to show the new government's commitment 
to democratic principles, social justice and the rule of law. See Huntington's 
( 1991:2 13-214) listing of the reasons. On the political strategy of the civilian 
authority using the human-rights issue to strengthen its bargaining power vis-a­
vis the military, and its limitations, see Zirker's ( 1988) study of Brazil. 
so Argentina is suggested here as exceptional. But a year after Fitch's publication, a 
military coup was attempted to oppose prosecution of human rights. In 1988 
two additional military uprisings were attempted. Although civilian governments 
led by Alfonsin and later Carlos Menem suppressed all of them, the government 
decided to pardon those officers who had been charged with human rights 
violations and even with coup attempts. Huntington's ( 199 1:23 1,  252) well­
know policy advice to the Third World democratizers was: 'If [regime] 
transformation occurs, do not attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials for 
human rights violation. The political costs of such an effort will outweigh any 
moral gains' . But, he says, if prosecution is morally and politically desirable, do 
it promptly against the authoritarian leaders, not against middle- and lower­
ranking officials. Against 'new' coup attempts, however, he recommends 'to 
ruthlessly punish the leaders of coups against your new government' . Thus, he 
distinguishes between 'past and present,' and between 'human-rights and coups' . 
Our focus in this section is, of course, on past human-rights abuses. 
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s i  See O'Donnell and Schmitter ( 1986:32, 35). They also emphasize that, in order 
to achieve these ends, the military spirit of professionalism has to be secured by 
democratic civilians. According to them, professionalization is often disturbed by 
civilian leaders who want to install officers loyal to their aspirations in high 
military office, even if that means jumping ranks or appointing less 
professionally competent candidates. s2 See Stepan ( 1988: Chapter 6). To emphasize the danger of a threatened military, 
Danopoulos ( 1992:20) suggests that the crafting of civilian control should 
include 'group participation and a sense of involvement in the definition of the 
broad methods and means of governing, conflict resolution, leadership selection, 
foreign and security policy goals, and the ways of distributing wealth' . However, 
giving such broad participation may undermine a new civilian's effort to 
demarcate the political-military boundary. 
s3 Zagorski's ( 1992:46) empirical study suggests that the incomplete period took 
eighteen months in Argentina, five years in Brazil, seven years in Chile, six 
years in Peru, and five years in Uruguay. Indonesia's transition from the Soeharto 
to the Habibie government has been in progress for less than a year, but similar 
dilemmas are already visible. s4 See, for example, Black's ( 1980) study of military perceptions during the 
Brazilian version of keterbukaan (openness), which started in 1979 and was called 
political decompression (distensao) or opening (abertura). According to Black, 
democratization was perceived by Brazilian officers as allowing political 
participation by those who accepted the military's own interpretation of its 
'moderating role' (p.635). Zirker ( 1986) found a growing nationalist inclination 
among the hardline officers during abertura. SS For the best analysis of military prerogatives, see Stepan's ( 1988) extensive 
study of incomplete extrication under the civilian president, Jose Sarney, in 
Brazil ( 1985-90). He lists eleven areas in which the military seeks prerogatives: 
in the constitution; in its relationship with the chief executive; in coordination 
of the defence sector; in its allocation of cabinet members; in the legislature; in 
appointment of senior civil servants; in the intelligence sector; in the role of the 
police; in military promotions; in state enterprises; and in the legal system. 
Stepan's model was modified and updated by Zaverucha ( 1993), who concluded 
that: 'civil-military relations did not advance, and particularly nothing substantial 
was done to curtail military prerogatives. Indeed the military continued openly 
challenging the constituted civilian authorities. Leaders of the democratic 
transition opted out of confronting the military over its scope for autonomy. In 
those rare cases when the Executive and Legislature tried to impose their will, 
the military threatened to disrupt the transition and the civilians simply resigned 
themselves to the continuation of military prerogatives' (ibid. :299) . 
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56 Hunter's detailed case studies of labour-rights, and budgetary and development 
issues leads her to conclude that military prerogatives are not necessarily 
translated into effective influence over policy outcomes. See Hunter ( 1997:7 1). 
57 Scholars tend to look at different interests involved in the process of authoritarian 
breakdown which is characterized by internal division within the military 
between hard- and softliners. However, the literature seems to have favoured a 
dichotomy of 'civilian vs. military' in the handling of past human rights abuses. 
Here, the role of the continuing internal split is less focused. The military, 
which retains old prerogatives, is said to become defensive in the face of civilian 
attempts at undermining its corporate interests and institutional autonomy. 
However, this perspective limits our observation of the pluralistic political 
process. When the key officers in the new military leadership-usually the 
softliners--endeavour to restore internal unity which has deteriorated as a result 
of their conflicts with the hardline group, they may endeavour to deal with the 
civilian authority on the issue of human rights, both in order to facilitate (and 
legitimize) the purging of the hardline faction and to strengthen the internal 
legitimacy of the current military leadership. If that is the case, the degree of the 
military's cooperation in the handling of past human rights abuses still depends 
on the logic of the internal military split, not the dichotomy of civil-military 
conflict. The new military leaders may find a technique to sideline human rights 
pressures by explaining the violations as the conduct of hardliners who had 
deviated from the military disciplinary codes. The 'professionally' -oriented 
softliners may think that, in order to defend the 'institutional' position of the 
military in the transition process, and to regain its internal cohesion, purging 
hardliners is a necessary step. Coping with democratic civilians is a rational 
choice if it helps to achieve that end. 
58 Welch ( 1992:327) suggests that 'there is a commonality in the literature of Latin 
American militaries that the new doctrine of national security has changed the 
military's professional role and stimulated its political role expansion, but 
reasons for muting the "new" professionalism remain unexplored in detail in the 
literature' . Doing so requires us to examine at least three aspects: mission, 
professionalism and doctrine. 
59 On the relationship between the DSN and internal intelligence, see Zagorski 
( 1992:55-58) . 
60 Huntington ( 1996: 10) similarly suggests peace-keeping missions because, 
although not conventional warfighting, they do involve the deployment of armed 
forces abroad in situations where they could be called upon to fire or be fired 
upon. Moreover, the involvement of the military in new international alliances 
and collaborative relationships can provide military establishments with 
constructive and demanding missions. 
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6 1  For details, see Hunter's ( 1994) cross-national comparison of civilian initiatives 
in redirecting military missions, and their problems. In Brazil, reducing the 
military budget also worked negatively as officers became unable to maintain 
their living standards and many started to find second jobs (ibid. : 643). In 
Indonesia, a similar concern was officially expressed by the Army Chief, Gen Edi 
Sudradjat, who had conducted internal military reforms, the so-called 'Back-to­
Basics' in 1992. 62 Bambang Yudhoyono was leader of Garuda Contingent 7 to Cambodia ( 1991), 
while Edi Budianto-a classmate and friend of Prabowo at the military 
academy-led Garuda Contingent 14 to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993. Bambang 
was the key adviser to Gen Wiranto. 
63 Interview with Rear Admiral A.A. Kustia, Coordinator of Expert Staff for Navy 
Chief-of-Staff, 3 October 1996. During the UN peace-keeping operations in 
Cambodia, Japanese Foreign Minister, Koji Kakizawa, who visited the country, 
commented that among foreign military observers Indonesian troops seemed to 
be the best disciplined and most friendly towards the local people. 
64 Interview with Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, Expert Staff for ABRI 
Commander in the Field of Industrial Affairs, 26 November 1996. 
65 Regarding external warfare in general, Odetala's case study illustrates that the 
mission may even undermine the professional standard in the cases of African 
militaries. He suggests that the conduct of wars created the necessity for rapid 
crash-training as well as 'quick' promotions within the military because of 
manpower needs to prosecute such wars. Premature promotions of more junior 
officers to act in more senior positions adversely affected organized growth of the 
professional military institutions (Odetola 1982:24). This may be an extreme 
case, but it casts doubt on the assumption that the external defence mission 
promotes professional orientations. 66 
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We intentionally avoid using the term 'Western professionalism', which is often 
used by scholars in explaining the non-interventionist military, to avoid the 
cultural-value orientation contained in the terminology which inclines to the 
'excessive universalism' of linking it to democratization and 'Western' values. 
Together with this, the New Order military's interpretation of democratic 
pressures tended to use the systems approach to neutralize criticism. The 1995 
White Paper argues that 'the range of domestic political problems has expanded 
basically because the rate of growth of political aspirations has far outstripped 
the rate at which the practice of democracy has matured. Imbalance between these 
two factors can disturb political stability '  (p. 10). This interpretative model­
which seems to borrow Huntington's ( 1968) political order thesis-allowed 
ABRI to view criticism as a matter of system disequilibrium, obscuring the 
aspect of policy failure of the regime (and ABRI) as the cause of growing 
political aspirations. 
5 1  
68 These are common perceptions of political militaries in developing countries. 
Lissak ( 1976:20) argues that their role perception stems from the distorted 
development of an otherwise legitimate distinction between the nation and the 
state. This distortion is manifested by an officer corps which considers itself the 
exclusive embodiment of the will of the nation and views all other functional 
groups as expressing only partial and temporary interests. Their self-image as 
guarantor of the permanent interests of the nation provides (in their eyes) the 
necessary legitimacy for them to assume the right to rule. Finer ( 1962:26) also 
suggests that: 'the moment the military draws the distinction between nation and 
the government in power, they begin to invent their own private notion of 
national interest and from this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of 
this view for that of the civilian government'. These self-images are strengthened 
by military professionalization in two ways: first, the indoctrination of national 
loyalty; secondly, the paradoxical reality that the profession's life-style gradually 
alienates officers from the rest of society. Feld's ( 1968:65-66) excellent study 
suggests that this alienation inclines the officer corps to assert that it is bound 
by a unique allegiance to the state, the constitution or a national tradition rather 
than to any particular regime (government). 
69 Similar institutional reforms are recommended by Christopher Donnelly, special 
adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs to NATO's secretary-general, in 
referring to the cases of Eastern European militaries which faced a wave of 
political demilitarization (Donnelly 1996) . 
70 The grand strategy-identification of primary enemies and threats-should be 
formulated by civilians with military advice. The strategy-how to combat 
them-should then be developed by the military with the approval of the civilian 
authority. Tactics-how weapons and organizations are to be used-should be 
almost entirely under military direction. The policy-the provision of 
manpower, material and other military resources-should be almost entirely 
under civilian control. 
7 1 Our argument here is not aimed at generalizing the direction of military reform 
which is, to large extent, determined by country-particular factors. Rather, the 
attempt is to clarify the configuration of the transformation process which is 
applicable to many civil-military patterns under democratic transition. It is 
beyond our focus to formulate catch-all alternative missions, partly because our 
analytical focus is not on grand theory, and partly because it is too early to 
evaluate this issue in the context of Indonesia's rapidly evolving civil-military 
relations. 
72 ABRI may insist that there is no civil-military dichotomy under Pancasila which 
insists on 'mutual help'. However, our discussion here focuses on the strategy of 
non-military forces which want to reduce the influence of ABRI in politics. 
From this perspective, the distinction between ABRI and others, or the military 
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and civilians, is inevitable. Although Pancasila and UUD45 have been used by 
Soeharto and ABRI as tools of exclusion, civilian empowerment of these regime 
symbols has been an effective critical activity in the sense that it uses the 
regime's own language to criticize military policies as deviations from Pancasila 
and UUD45 and directly attack the very core of the regime's ideological project. 
See Rasyid (1994:349) and Liddle and King ( 1996:29-30) for vivid evaluations of 
this mode of resistance. Rasyid was recruited by the Habibie government as the 
chairman of the Study Team for Political Laws (Tim Pengkajian UU Politik) 
which was formed to revise the New Order political laws which had restricted 
popular political participation. It is possible that his assessment of Pancasila 
will become a tool for engineering future civil-military relations, and he himself 
admits the efficacy of the approach. (Interview with Professor Ryaas Rasyid, 29 
October 1998). 
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